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PART ONE 
THE PROBLEMATIC WITHIN THE SARTREAN SYSTEM 
The Sartrean ontology, presented in ~ei~ ~Nothips­
ness, is paradoxical inasmuch as it rests upon two radically 
distinct realms of being, which, nevertheless, are totally 
bound. These realms which serve as the ultimate ontological 
principles of Sartre's system are: being-in-itself and being-
for-itself, or "thing" and consciousness, Being and Nothingness. 
Yet, while the In-itself and the For-itself function as ultimate 
principles, Bartre does not wield them to generate further prin-
ciples. Instead, he employs descriptions of concrete human at-
titudes to show that the diverse experiences of man-in-the-world 
are but variations upon ~ ontological theme: the For-itself's 
de facto relation to the In-itself. l Consequently, he claims 
the complete comprehensiveness of the In-itself and the For-
itself as ontological principles and thereby repudiates any 
need for a deduction of further principles. But what, pre-
cisely, is Bartre's perspective in developing his philosophy? 
IFor Sartre, it is an abstraction to treat of these 
principles in isolation from one another. He states: "It is 
not profitable first to separate the two terms of a relation 
in order to try to join them together again later. The relation 
is a synthesis. • • • The concrete is man within the world 
••• " Being and Nothi~SS (cited hereafter as ml), trans. 
by Hazel E. J!arnes (Nework: The Philosophical LIDrary, 1956), 
3. The metaphysical import of Sartre's contention that the 
For-itself exists only as a relation to the In-itself is the 
dominant concern of this thesis. 
2 
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How, specifically, does he arrive at his ontological principles 
and evince their comprehensiveness? What is the structure of 
these principles? 
TIm METHOD .AND STARTING POINT OF SARTRE' S ONTOLOGY 
---................ - - ............... ----
As revealed by the subtitle to Being ~ Nothingness: 
"An Essay,!!!. Phenomenological Ontology," Sartre's philosophic 
intent is to establish an ontology on phenomenological grounds. 
Indicative of this interplay of ontology and phenomenology in 
the eyes of Sartre is the very structure of Being ~ Nothing-
ness. For, the Introduction reveals the In-itself and the For-
itself on the phenomenological ground of the fundamental in-
tentionality of consciouaness and the remaining chapters dis-
close the Sartrean employment of the phenomenological method to 
show the presence and the original relation of these princip~s 
in basic human situations. Phenomenology's attention to the 
concrete as revelatory of fundamental ontological structures, 
its descriptive bent and its emphasis upon the basic intention-
ality of consciousness thus bear heavily upon Sartrean ontology 
--an ontology which takes its rise from phenomenological grounds 
and returns to phenomenology to evince the comprehensiveness of 
its principles. But, more specifically, how does Sartre's 
phenomenological approach reveal the In-itself and the For-itself, 
the two distinct regions of being? 
To answer this question, we must traverse the rough 
terrain of the Sartrean Introduction to Being and Nothingness. 
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In his opening statement, Bartre credits modern thought with 
having realized considerable progress by reducing the existent 
to the series of appearances which manifest it. The impetus for 
this reduction had been to surmount the prevalent dualisms of 
being and appearance, act and potency, essence and appearance. 
But, granting that being does not stand behind appearances, 
granting that the phenomenal being is nothing more than the con-
nected series of its manifestations according to an essential 
law, Bartre questions whether modern thought succeeded in its 
attempt to remove all dualisms from a legitimate status within 
philosophy. It seems to him, rather, that a new dualism has 
'c emerged: the .fini te and the infj.ni te t a dualism which affords 
Sartre not only a new interpretation of the former dualisms, 
but also a means of access to the two regions of being. But, 
what is this "new dualism"? 
The meaning of the Sartrean duality of the finite and 
the infinite can perhaps best be grasped by describing a per-
ceptive act. For example, I am walking down the street and my 
eyes rest upon a tree situated off in the distance. As I first 
approach the tree, this mass of greens and browns appears as 
though it were an Impressionist painting. But, as I draw closer, 
the mass becomes more defined, takes on its peculiarly dis-
tinctive shape. My attention is drawn to the random arrangement 
of the leaves, to their various shades of green, to the multiple 
hues within one leaf, to the branch from which it springs, to 
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the asymmetrical disposition o~ the branches, to the trunk from 
which they originate a11.d so on ~ i~initum. Each appearance of 
the tree is transcended by me toward another manifestation withi 
the series of appearances which constitute 'tree.' Then. too, 
in walking about the tree, I perceive that the array, the colors 
appear novel at each stopping point. I recognize that if it 
were possible for me to stop at each point in this circular path 
about the tree and take a point of view on it, each profile 
would be unequalled. Thus, as there are potentially an intini te 
number of points within a circle, though the circle be bound, 
finite, so, too, are there an infinite number of points of view 
it9 be taken on the tree, thol...gh the tree be fin! te. Because I 
am a subJec.lli capable of changing my points of view on the tree, 
the finitude of the appearance of the tree is surpassed toward 
-infinity. This, then, is what Sartre means by the dualism of 
finite and infinite. 
The significance of "the infinite in the finite" for 
Sartre's ontology lies in its staging his sole point of de-
parture--the fundamental intentionality of consciousness. This 
the dualism achieves in two interrelated ways: (1) by reveal-
ing the phenomenal existent as transcendent, and (2) by posing 
the problem of the being of the phenomenon through its read-
mission of the former dualisms. These pOints, however, require 
examination. 
Regarding the first, Sartre maintains that the infinite 
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series of manifestations of an object, indicated by the infinite 
number of points of view that can be taken on it, reveals the 
phenomenon as transcendent. In other words, the inexhaustibil-
ity of an object, manifested by the inability of a consciousness 
to grasp it in its totality, shows that the phenomenon is not a 
subjective affectation, but rather is other than consciousness, 
independent of consciousness as subject. Thus, Bartre's state-
ment, leveled against any idealistic position: "Understand that 
our theory of the phenomenon replaced the reality of the thing 
by the objectivity of the phenomenon and that it has based this 
on an equal to infinity. ,,2 But this appeal to infinity has 
another consequence for Bartre's theory of the phenomenon--that 
of readmitting the former dualisms which modern thought dis-
claimed. 
Among the dualisms re-entering the legitimate sphere of 
philosophy, Bartre avers, is that of potency and act. Because 
the inexhaustibility of an object implies a reference to the 
infini te, a certain "potency" returns to inhabit the phenome-
non--the "potency" to exhibit an infinite number of manifesta-
tions. This possibility, however, is revealed only because 
there is a consciousness capable of taking an infinite number of 
points of view on the object. Hence, "potency" returns to the 
phenomenon ~ only 2!! ~ ground 2! intentional activity.3 
2BN, xlvii. 
3Inasmuch as the major question of this thesis concerns 
? 
Another dualism readmitted by Sartre is that of essence 
and appearance. Because of the inexhaustibility of an object, 
essence is in principle that which must be manifested by an in-
finite series of individual appearances. Consequently, essence 
is severed from any one appearance which refers to it and a 
dualism arises. Yet, Sartre claims that proceeding from in-
dividual appearances, one "can always determine the essence 
which they imply, as a sign implies its meaning.,,4 The sever-
ance of essence from appearance, then, takes the form of a sev-
erance of the meaning of a sign from the sign. From which po-
sition Sartre concludes: "The essence is not ~ the object; it 
is the meaning of the object, ••• ,,5 But, if essence is not 
in the object, what is the source of essence? Sartre answers, 
it is through consciousness that the meaning of an object, its 
consciousness as the source of metaphysical categories, it 
should be noted that the very appeal to infinity is grounded in 
the structure of consciousness. That the finitude of the ap-
pearance of an object is surpassed to infinity rests upon the 
fact that a subject is capable ot changing points of view on an 
object. Thus, the potency-act dualism, together with the other 
dualisms to which the infinite-finite duality gives rise, has 
consciousness as its ultimate source. This crucial role of the 
Sartrean consciousness will also be indicated in the subsequent 
discussions of the other dualisms. 
4nN, xlix. Via this claim, Sartre, however, retreats 
from the IOgical conclusion that the essence of any object can-
not be determined inasmuch as the infinite "series itself will 
never appear." <![, xlvii). 
5BN, xlix. 
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essence, comes into the world. For, he claims, it is only be-
cause a consciousness is in an intentional relation with an ob-
ject that the object is revealed as structured. Thus essence 
re-enters the philosophic arena in a manner similar to the 
readmission of potency--~~ correlate 2! human intentional ~ 
tivity .. 
There is, however, still another dualism readmitted on 
the basis of the infinite-finite duality and thereby on the 
ground of the intentional activity of consciousness: the dual-
ism of being and appearance. Rejecting a Kantian interpretation 
of this dualism, Sartre claims that there is nothing behind the 
appearance. Are we to conclude, then, that the being of phenom-
ena appears? Inasmuch as we have some grasp of being and can 
speak of it, Sartre avers, there must be an appearance of being 
and, in fact, being is manifested to us through the immediacy 
of lived experience. Yet, he asks, Itis the being which dis-
closes itself to me, appears to me, of the same nature as the 
being of existents which appear to me?tt6 Is the phenomenon of 
being identical with the being of phenomena? Is the appearance 
of this page identical with the being of this page? Granted 
that the whiteness of this page appears to me, yet being cannot 
be reduced to a simple quality. Granted that the various qual-
ities of this page refer to an essence, to the meaning of this 
object, yet meaning is not identical with being. That any 
6EN xlviii. 
-' 
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object is in principle inexhaustible, moreover, precludes the 
disclosure of the totality of its being. And yet, it cannot be 
said that the object hides its being, since being is not "be-
hind" the qualities which appear. What, then, can be said of 
the being of phenomena? Simply, that being is the condition of 
all revealing and is coextensive with the phenomenon. That any 
object is in principle inexhaustible precludes the reduction of 
the being of the phenomenon to the phenomenon of being, and 
herein lies the meaning of the dualism of being and appearance 
for Bartre. The being of phenomena, as the condition of reveal-
ing, cannot exist only insofar as it appears. Thus the being of 
phenomena surpasses the knowledge which we have of it and pro-
vides the basis for knowledge. But a problem remains as to the 
character of this transphenomenal being. 
Sartre's sole point of departure in solving the ontolog-
ical problem of the transphenomenal being--a departure already 
indicated by the structure of the infinite-finite dualism, the 
dualism founded upon the former and the transcendent character 
of objects revealed by the former--is the fundamental inten-
tionality of consciousness. 7 Adopting the Husserlian thesis 
7Inasmuch as the method and starting point of Sartre's 
ontology is under consideration, the thesis of James Collins 
demands comment. Collins claims that Bartre's ontology rests 
upon a twofold option that precedes all his philosophizing: 
"Nietzsche's atheistic postulate and Husserl's postulate of a 
self-sufficient phenomenology." (Cf. his "Sartre's Postulatory 
Atheism," The Existentialists llrateway edition; Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Comp~, 1960.J, 46). "In his system, atheism is not 
. 
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that "All consciousness is consciousness of something,1I Sartre 
wields this thesis in such a way that it is responsive not only 
to an elucidation of the transphenomenal regions of being, but 
also to the waging of a criticism against the epistemological 
stances of realism and idealism. 8 How does Sartre maneuver this 
dual play upon his treatment of consciousness? 
Seeking ultimately to show the irreducibility of the 
being of consciousness and the being of phenomena, Sartre 
part of the evidence but a presupposition deliberately laid down 
as a determinant of evidence. It (~. ~. t 87). Issue is taken 
with the evidence cited by Collins in support of his thesis of 
a postulat0rit atheism. The "system" of Sartre sat ttsystem" is 
presen£ed 0 y in Bei~ and Nothi~ess which in cates solely 
the basic intentional~-O? consc~sness as a point of depart-
ure. Sartre's declaration O.t atheism, moreover, does not appear 
in his novels, essays or plays until after the publication of 
~i~ and Nothingness. There is no evidence, furthermore, that 
ar re-a[ose phenomenolo~ in order to dispose of God--a view 
which Collins seeks to show (~. cit., 46-48)--particularly in 
view of Bartre's utilization or pnenomenology to arrive at the 
transphenomenal being of consciousness. Finally, Collins' em-
phasizing of Nietzsche's atheistic influence upon Sartre, to-
gether with his statement that "He permits criticism of Nietzsche 
only on those points where the latter ceases to be the prophet 
of atheistic existentialism" (~. cit., 50) is highly question-
able inasmuch as Sartre, proneto CIte historical influences, 
merely mentions Nietzsche twice in Beins and Nothingness (xlvi, 
541) and neither of the lnsignifican£ passages refers to an 
atheistic context or criticizes Nietzsche. Gilbert Varet points 
out the only position which can be internally' evinced in Sartre's 
s~stematic work: "Chez Sartra le point de depart n'est pas la 
r allte-n-wnaine, ou l' ex1st~nce 'IOU la mauvaise foi, ou 
l'atheisme, mais bien la phenomenologie de Huss~rl,--et d'abord 
Son 'acquisition fond~ntale: l'intentionalite'." (Cf. 
Ltontolo,ie de Sartra lEaris: Presses Univarsitaires de France, 
I94[1, 2. -
Bvaret points out the general relationship of phenom-
enology and epistemology in his L'Ontologie de Sartre, 14-25. 
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interprets the dictum of Husserl as meaning that "consciousness 
has no 'content',,,9 that consciousness is in itself something 
other than a knowledge turned back upon itself, that conscious-
nesS is a positional consciousness of the world. In other 
words, consciousness is such that it goes outside itself to 
reach its object. In being conscious of a tree, one's con-
sciousness is absorbed in the tree. The tree, Sartre maintains, 
is not !a one's consciousness, not even in the form of an ade-
quate representation. For, to introduce an object into con-
sciousness would involve introducing an opacity into conscious-
ness because of the inexhaustibility of any object. Such an 
introduction would refer to infinity the inventory which- con-
sciousness could make of itself, would "make consciousness a 
thing"lO and would thereby deny the Sartrean cogi~.. Hence 
Sartre I s insistence that consciousness has no content. Bu-!;; what 
is the Sartrean cogito? 
9BN, Ii. Sartre initiates this discussion with a crit-
icism of HUsserl's epistemological and ontological stance. He 
claims that while Husserl understood that the foundation of 
being for the totality "perceived-perception" could not itself 
be subject to the perciii, he erred in concluding that the being 
which founds knowledge s the transphenomenal being of con-
sciousness. For, Sartre avers, this conclusion has as its 
counterpart the equally erroneous position that the being of the 
percipi, of the phenomenon, can be reduced to the being of con-
scIousness. Yet, while intent upon refuting idealism, Sartre is 
equally using Husserl's position to serve the development of the 
Sartrean ontology by its introduction of another dimension of 
transphenomenal being--that of consciousness. 
lO!!, Ii. 
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Continuing his manipulation of epistemological concerns 
to yield ontological information, Sartre seeks to disclose the 
Sartrean cogito by examining the necessary condition for all 
knowing consciousnesses. The prerequisite for all knowing con-
sciousnesses, he cites, is an awareness of being conscious of 
something. This secondary awareness, however, must be implicit 
in the primary consciousness, or one should be aware of being 
conscious of something and aware of being aware of being con-
scious of something ad infinitum. Why an infinite regress? 
Because of the subject-object dualism constitutive of any know-
ing consciousness. Thus, Sartre maintains that, unless we wish 
to admit an infinite regress, "there must be an immediate, non-
cognitive relation ot the self to itself."ll There must be a 
non-thetic consciousness accompanying and founding avery posi-
tional consciousness. 
That there ~ such a non-thetic consciousness can, 
moreover, be quite simply illustrated. In playing tennis, 
although my positional consciousness is directed toward the 
tennis ball, I am nevertheless implicitly aware that I am now 
making a smashing backhand. Furthermore t it anyone were to ask 
me what I was doing, I would immediately reply: "Attempting a 
backhand." What does this response indicate? First of all, 
it reveals that my consciousness as positional is also a re-
flecting consciousness and can posit the instantaneous 
ll!lit liii. 
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consciousness as its object. Secondly, and more strategically, 
it veri£ies the existence of those implicit awarenesses which 
have passed without being reflected upon and yet condition and 
make possible the reflection. In terms of such evidence as 
this, then, Sartre claims the existence of a non-thetic or pre-
reflective consciousness conditioning the thetic Cartesian 
cogito. This non-thetic consciousness, however, is not to be 
considered a new consciousness. Rather, the Sartrean cogito is 
"~ onll mode 2!. existence which is possible £££.. !. conscious-
ness of someth1pg,n l2 it is the being of the knower, tla mode of 
apprehension which is not a phenomenon of knowledge but is the 
structure of being. nl3 Sartrets employment of epistemological 
concerns has thus led to the discovery of a transphenomenal 
being of consciousness, but Sartre has still to prove the ir-
reducibility of the transphenomenal being of the knower and the 
transphenomenal being of phenomena, has still to solve the 
problem of the character of the being of phenomena. 
In effect, however, the Sartrean repudiation of the 
idealist reduction and the Sartrean avowal of the primacy of the 
thing perceived over o'ur knowledge of it have already been 
staged. For not only does the transcendent, inexhaustible char-
acter of the object preclude its identification with the knowl-
edge one has of it, but experience also evinces that in knowledge 
12m!, live 
l3~, lvii. 
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the object does not become consciousness and disappear as this 
object. The perceived being is thus cut off from consciousness, 
is independent of consciousness in its very being. Hence the 
transphenomenal being which is consciousness can neither found 
the phenomenon of being nor be identified with the being of the 
14 phenomenon. 
Though the pl"eceding conclusion puts to rest the ideal-
ist reduction, Sartre formulates an "ontological proof" of the 
independent being of the phenomenon, ~ proof derived from ~ 
existential status 2! consciousness, from the non-thetic cogito. 
Utilizing the dictum "all consciousness is consciousness of 
something" as the definition of the bein,g of the knower, Sartre 
considers two alternative meanings for consciousness. Con-
sciousness can be interpreted either as consti~~tive of the 
being of its object or as, in its innermost nature, a relation 
to a transcendent being. The first interpretation, however, is 
fallacious since consciousness of something is consciousness of 
an inexhaustible plenitude which consciousness is not, as was 
--
previously shown. That consciousness is consciousness of some-
thing must thus be interpreted in the second way as meaning that 
l4Sartre points out that the phenomenalists erred in 
failing to recognize this non-identity: "Having justifiably re-
duced the object to the connected series of its appearances, the 
believed they had reduced its being to the succession of its 
modes of being." (~, lx) 
15 
"transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness."l; 
In other words, the structure of consciousness is such that it 
reaches out beyond itself. As intentional, consciousness has no 
being other than to be a revealing and hence requires something 
revealed. Built into the very structure of consciousness, there-
fore, is the demand for the support of a being which is other 
than consciousness. This being, which supports consciousness in 
its being, is but the transphenomenal being of phenomena, the 
In-itself. 16 
The Sartrean "ontological proof" thus reveals the inde-
pendence of the being of phenomena, of the In-itself, by claim-
ing that the being ot consciousness is a consciousness of some-
thing which it !! B2i and thereby is dependent upon something 
which it is ~, namely, the In-itself. Sartre's employment of 
the phenomenological method and his wielding of the fundamental 
intentionality of consciousness have hence yielded three onto-
logical discoveries eXpressed in the "ontological proof": (1) 
the In-itself is independent in its being; (2) the For-itself !! 
~theln-itself; and (3) the Por-itself is a relation to the 
In-itself in virtue of its dependence upon the latter. These 
ontological conclusions, afforded Sartre by phenomenology, point, 
15m, !xi. 
-
l60f• Robert E. Butts, "Does 'Intentionality' Imply 
'Being'? A Paralogism in Sartre's Ontology," Journal of Phi-
losophy. LV (1958), 911-12, for a critique of Sartre's-ontolog-
1ca~ argument. 
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however, to a dual paradox which grips the Sartrean ontology. 
First, the two regions of transphenomenal being, viewed as radi-
cally distinct, are nevertheless declared bound in virtue of 
the For-itself's intrinsic relation to the In-itself. Secondly, 
the For-itself's dependence upon the In-itself reveals the on-
tological priority of the In-itself in Sartre's system, but 
within that system the For-itself--not the In-itself--bears the 
ontological burden of bringing "potency" and. "essence" into the 
world, of issuing, in general, the categories of being. To gain 
a clearer grasp of this twofold paradox which engulfs the 
Sartrean ontology, however, we must consider what Sartre con-
ceives as the characteristios of the In-itself and the For-
itself. 
THE IN-ITSELF ~ ~ FOR-ITSELF 
Being-in-itself 
The being of phenomena, or being-in-itself t is nothing 
other than the being of this page, of this typewriter. As in-
dicated by the infinite-finite dualism, the "primary character-
istic ft of the In-itself is "never to reveal itself completely to 
consciousness. ttl? But what are its other characteristics? The 
In-itself, Sartre claims, is inherence in self without distance; 
it is total, coincidence with itself and. hence cannot refer to 
itself. Because of such utter undividedness, the region of the 
l?mi" !xii. 
17 
In-itself is thus governed by the principle of non-contradiction 
Its complete self-containment and identity preclude its requiri 
connection with what it is not. But, having no otherness, the 
In-itself, moreover, escapes becoming. Beyond becoming, it has 
no past and no future and hence is also beyond temporality. It 
simply is, is what it is, is in-itself.18 Derived neither from 
another existent nor from a possibility, since possibility is a 
structure of consciousness and consciousness itself depends upon 
the In-itself, the In-itself, Bartre concludes, is contingently, 
escaping both necessity and possibility. 
If one were to ask Sartre to describe the manner in 
which such characteristics are disclosed, he might well proceed 
in somewhat the following way. Take the example of a rock. The 
infinite-finite duality reveals that my consciousness cannot ex-
haust the being of this rock. Not only is this true of a simple 
confrontation with this rock, but it is equally true of any sci-
entific analysis that my consciousness makes upon this rock. 
Though I may well discern the constituents of this rock and 
their respective percentages of composition, the being of this 
rock eludes my analysis. The rock is so opaque, so self-con-
tained., that I cannot ttbreak in" and "get a grip on its being." 
The rock is a rock with full positivity, complete identity. I 
l8Sartre states: "Being is. Being is in-itself. Being 
is yhat it is. These are the three characteristics which the 
preliminary examination of the phenomenon of being allows us to 
assign to the being of phenomena." (BN, lxvi) 
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cannot say o~ it: "It isn't itsel~ today," because it has no 
otherness; it is--rock. That it is situated on this patch o~ 
grass, moreover, makes no dif~erence to the rock, as verified 
by my moving it, ~or this rock has no intrinsic connection to 
what it is not. Then, too, this rock does not reveal itself as 
having a past or a future. Nor is it meaningful to speak of the 
rock as having a past or a future, for the rock is, and, as 
utter coincidence with itself, escapes temporality which re-
quires dimensional distance. From a confrontation with an 
object such as the rock, Sartre thus discerned an ontological 
principle characterized by undividedness, identity, opacity, 
fullness, permanence, independence and non-temporality--this is 
the In-itself.19 
Being-for-itself 
If one were to negate the characteristics of the In-
itself, one would have, in a limited way, a view of the For-
itself. Limited, for to consider these regions in strict iso-
lation would be to misconstrue reality as Sartre envisions it. 
The concrete, the real, is the synthetic totality, man-in-the-
world. Hence, as the characteristics of the In-itself are 
190nly a brief sketch of the In-itself 1s intended in 
these introductory remarks. An amplification upon the charac-
teristics cited will be made in a later context. Cf. M. Corvez, 
"L'Etre-en-soi dans la philosophie de Jean-Paul Sartre," Revue 
Thomiste, LVIII (1950), 360-72, for an exceptionally good account 
of the Sartrean In-itself. 
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revealed because a consciousness is in relation to it, so, too, 
the characteristics of man are revealed only if he is considered 
in the world. But what can be said of man-in-the-world, of the 
For-itself? 
Examining various attitudes and activities which man 
assumes in and toward the world, Bartre claims the discovery of 
a transphenomenality of non-being as actual as that of being-in-
itself. To illustrate this disclosure of non-being, he puts 
forth an analysis of a concrete, negative judgment. Having an 
appointment with Pierre in a cafe, one goes there, looks around 
and states: "He is not here." Is it absurd to speak of an in-
tuition of the non-being, of the absence of Pierre? Or, is it 
absurd to assert the truth of a negative judgment that is un-
founded in reality? Employing the Gestalt premise that per-
ception always implies the construction of a figure on a ground, 
Bartre maintains that when one enters the cafe his attention is 
directed toward the appearance of Pierre. So directed, one 
negates the elements of the cafe which appear as not being 
Pierre and thus orientates them as the ground upon which Pierre 
is given as about to appear. But Pierre is not here and yet the 
whole cafe remains the ground upon which the absence of Pierre 
looms before him, given intuitively. Granted that one's ex-
pectation has caused the absence of Pierre to happen, Pierre's 
absence is nonetheless a real event; the non-being of Pierre 
haunts the cafe in all its plenitude. There is, then, a real 
20 
relation between this non-being and the being of the cafe, in 
contrast to the relation of thought between Napoleon's absence 
and the cafe. Thus Sartre concludes: "Non-being does not come 
to things by a negative judgment; it is the negative judgment, 
on the contrary, which is conditioned and supported by non-
being.,,20 There is, therefore, a transphenomenality of nol'l-
being. But what is the relation between being and that non-
being which haunts it? What, moreover, is the origin of noth-
ingness? 
Regarding the relation between being and non-being, the 
Sartrean example has illustr~ted that Pierre's absence appears 
only on the ground. of the cafe's plen! tude of being and hence 
that non-being "exists only on the surface of being, «21 subse-
quent to being. Sartre claims, however, that non-being must 
not be considered as a peripheral threat surrounding being.22 
/ / If the negatites that occur within the world--absence, de-
struction, distance-~are to be founded, then non-being must 
20BN, 11. Sartre also considers the human activities 
of interrogation and destruction as revealing a transphenomen-
ality of non-baing. But the import of the co~sideration of 
negative judgment is the repudiation of the view that non-being 
is solely a structure of negative judgment. Cf. 1[, 6-12. 
21BN , 16. Cf. BN, 12-16 for Sartre's negative dialectic 
with the Hegelian view O? the relation between being and non-
being. 
22Sartre is here rejecting Heideggerts view of the 
relation between being and non-being. For his critique of the 
Heideggerian view, cf. ![. 16-21. 
appear at the heart of being, must be grounded in a negative 
being which itself appears at the heart of the world. 
What is this negative being which issues nothingness? 
21 
That the In-itself is in principle excluded from being the sourc 
of nothingness is evinced, according to Sartre, by its very 
positivity, plenitude and identity. Since the only other region 
of transphenomenality is that of the For-itself, since patterns 
of conduct including interrogation. destruction and negative 
judgment reveal forms of non-being, human reality must be the 
source of nothingness. To emit nothingness, human reality, 
moreover, must be nothingness. As Sartre asserts: "The being 
by which Nothingness comes into the world must be its own 
Nothingness.,,23 That consciousness is nothingness, furthermore, 
fulfills Sartre's demand that non-being be subsequent to being; 
for, as attested by the "ontological proof," consciousness re-
quires in its being the support of the In-itself inasmuch as it 
constitutes itself as not In-itself. Consciousness, then, ex-
isting only as a dynamic naughting of the In-itself, is the 
/ I 
nothingness which issues the negatites which appear at the heart 
of the world. 
The preceding Sartrean argumentation claiming nothing-
ness as the structure of the For-itself represents Sartre's in-
itial pronouncement in favor of the view that the For-itself is 
23~, 23. 
22 
non-substantial,24 that is, that consciousness lacks identity 
with itself; that consciousness is not opaque, self-contained, 
fully determinate; that consciousness is not determined by some-
thing which it is; that consciousness is not a static unity, a 
mere support. The Sartrean claim of insubstantiality for the 
For-itself is thus a claim that human reality cannot ~ in a 
fixed and final manner. As insubstantial, as nothingness, human 
reality is rather the possibility of self-detachment, of per-
petual withdrawal in relation to itself--a possibility which, 
moreover, conditions every rupture with the world, every nihil-
at ion ot the contingent In-itself. In other words, as insub-
stantial, as nothingness, consciousness ~ freedom. 25 Continu-
ally on the road of self-construction, consciousness must con-
tinually choose. As a freedom engaged in the task of selt-
construction, consciousness is at one stroke the putting ot its 
past (an instance of its necessary connection with the In-itselt 
of its facticity) out of play and the choice of an end which is 
, 
not-yet, an end which is in the future. Consciousness as free-
dom is thus the selt-temporalizing present which finds its 
24C£. Norman N. Greene, Jean-Paul Sartre: The Exist-
entialist Ethic (University of Michigan: Inn Arbor-raperbacks, 
1963), 16-18 for a lucid account of the non-substantiality of 
consciousness. 
25Ct • M. Cranston, Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Grove 
Press, 1962), 44-49, for a discussion of the Sartrean usage of 
the term "nothingness" and its relation to the principle of 
freedom. 
23 
future an open horizon of possibilities and which transcends ~ 
nihilation what it has been, what it has made itself, that is, 
its essence. Freedom, as consciousness, as nothingness, hence 
reveals that human reality is never simply what it is, that 
human reality is always at a distance from itself. 
Inasmuch as consciousness is a negative being of in-
ternal distance, is the nihilation of the In-itself, conscious-
ness lacks the permanence, fullness, coincidence with itself, in 
a word, the substantiality which characterizes the In-itself. 
As lack, consciousness is desire--desire of the substantiality 
of the In-itself while retaining the translucidity of conscious-
ness. Consciousness attempts to recover the substantiality 
which it perpetually nihilates by relating itself to the In-
itself through knowledge and action. But, Sartre avers, the 
attempt is doomed to failure. For, to become In-itself, con-
sciousness would lose itself as consciousness. Hence, Qon-
sciousness, as the nihilation of the In-itself and as the pro-
ject toward the value In-itself-For-itsel! or God, is an internal 
negation in suspension, neither In-itself nor In-itself-For-
itself. "The nature ot consciousness simultaneously is to be 
what it is not and not to be what it is."26 Consciousness ~ 
the In-itsel!, in the mode of not-being it, and ~ its possible, 
the In-itself-For-itself, in the mode of not-being it. As in-
ternal negation, consciousness thus exists after the manner of 
26![, 70. 
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a relation. As Sartre asserts: liThe For-itself is relation,,,27 
the original relation between the realms of In-itself and For-
itself. 28 
Dynamism, possibility, freedom, temporality, facticity, 
non-coincidence with self, lack, desire, value, internal nega-
tion, non-substantiality, relation--such are the characteristics 
of the Sartrean For-itself as viewed in a preliminary fashion. 29 
But there is one further point to be indicated at this time. 
Recalling Spinoza's dictum: "All determination is negation," 
Sartre claims that determination springs from negation. Con-
sciousness, as internal negation, thus bears the burden of is-
suing all the determinations in the world, of issuing the tra-
ditional categories of being as such. The reason for the para-
doxical disproportion between the ontological priority of the 
In-itself and the ontological task of the For-itself within the 
Sartrean system, a disproportion previouslJ cited,30 hence rests 
with the structure of the For-itself as internal negation and 
27!!!, 362. 
28J!!, 617. 
29Two good articles dealing with the Sartrean For-itself 
are: M. Corvez, "L'Etre de la conscience dans la philosopbie de 
J.-P. Sartre," Revue Thomiste, LVIII (1950), 562-74; and J. 
Graaten, ttLe soi chez Klerkegaard et Sartre," Revue Phllosophiq'U,E 
!!!. Louvain. L (1952), 64-89. 
30Cf • above, 15-17. 
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Sartre's acceptance of the principle that determination springs 
from negation. But, while Sartre's grounds for assigning con-
sciousness the task of issuing all determination have been dis-
cerned, a problem, nevertheless, emerges. 
STATEMENT Q! THE PROBLEM 
Within the Sartrean framework, consciousness thus looms 
before us as a dynamic negation which originates the determina-
tions of being as such. Multiple dimensions of this functioning 
of consciousness have been manifested in this introductory con-
sideration of Sartre's ontology: first, that the finitude of 
the appearance of an object is surpassed to infin! ty occurs be-
cause there is a consciousness capable of taking diverse points 
of view on an object; second, that certain "potencies" return 
to inhabit the In-itself, as the "potency" to exhibit an in-
finite number of manifestations, occurs because there is a con-
sciousness relating itself to the In-itself; and finally, that 
essence, the meaning of an object, re-·enters the region of the 
In-itself occurs because of human intentional activity. Yet, 
these are but a few of the determinations of being as such whi~~ 
issue from consciousness. Sartre further deems consciousness 
responsible for the upsurge of such traditional categories of 
being as place, quantity, quality, potentiality, temporality 
and relation itself. In view of this striking affirmation, our 
question to Sartre is: tI~ consciousness, the For-itself, 
26 
bear the burden of_ originating the catesories 2!. beiAS, qua 
being?" This question arises in terms of the radical distinc-
tion between the For-i t;3elf and the In-i taelf, a distinction 
indicated by the diverse characteristics of these regions and 
culminated by the assertions that the For-itself is relat10n,3l 
while the In-itsel_f is substance; 32 that the For-itself 1s 
Nothingness; the In-itself, Being. How can the For-itself, then 
so ontologically dissimilar from the In-itself, issue categories 
of being which bridge both ontological realms and are applicable 
to each? 
That this type of question is posed justifiably is 
recognized by Bartre himself in the concluding remarks of Being 
~Nothingness.33 Considering the question of whether the 
regions of For-itself and In-itself can be classified under a 
general heading termed "Being," Sartre points out that such a 
question is not ontological, but rather is metaphysical. To 
those who wish to concern themselves with such issues, Bartre 
suggests, however, that the notions of immanence and trans-
cendence should both be taken into consideration. 
Following Bartre's suggestion in discerning whcthe~ th~ 
For-itself as relation can bear the burden of originating the 
categories of being, we shall consider the meaning of the 
310f• ~, 1?1-?2, 362; 492-93; 575-?6; 624. 
32Cf • ~, 1?1-?2; 459; 506. 
330f • ![, 621-25. 
27 
For-itself qua relation from the dual aspect of immanence and 
transcendence. But we shall raise the further question of 
whether this relation, the For-itself, is substantialized. Al-
though Sartre r~peatedly denies that the For-itself is sub-
stantial with such remarks as: "Our description of the for-
itself has shown us how this, on the contrary. is removed as 
far as possible from a substance ••• :34 the justification for 
our questioning such assertions will be made evident by an ex-
amination of the characteristics of the For-itself and of the 
way in which Sartre handles the For-itself in drawing out the 
categories of being. This question of the substantialization 
of the For-itself, moreover, bears upon our metapr~sical con-
cern inasmuch as a substantialization of the For-itself would 
indicate a common ground between the two regions of being. which 
in turn, would give more plausibility to t~e Saptrean attempt to 
introduce the categories of being through the For-itself. Our 
approach. then, is to elucidate the meaning of the For-itself 
as relation and to examine the question of whether the For-
itself is substantialized, with the hope that the insights 
gleaned from these investigations will give us the answer to 
34BN, 171. Cf. also _BN, 84; 174; 431; 453; 459; 462; 
551; 618. --
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our ~etaphysical issue. 35 
35As we approach a detailed examination of the Sartrean 
ontology, it would be well to note those studies which present 
an extensive, critical summary of Beigg and Nothin~ess: H. J. 
Blackham, ItJean-Paul Sartre,lI Six EXlsteiitTalis~ ThIllkers (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959),110-481 w. besan, The Tragic 
Finale (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1~60); F. Jeanson, Le 
Probleme morale et la pensee de Sartre (Paris: Editions au 
Hyrte,-,c941); R.~oIrvet, Les-rroctrines existentialistes de 
Kierkegaard a J-P. Sartre rADbaye Salnt-Wannrille, 1948),-r44-
230; M. Nataiison, A Critl.9,ue of Jean-Paul Sartre' s Ontology (Lincoln: University 0:C Nebraska Press, 1951); J. Sa1vall~To 
Be and Not To Be (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 19b2); 
r. Troisfontalnes, Le Choix de Jean-Paul Sartre: E~ose et 
critique de 'LtEtre-et Ie neant i (2na ea.; Paris: lUbler-et Cie, 
1946); G. ""Varet, L 'OntolOgie ne Sartre (Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 1948);Jr. Verneaux, "L'Ontologie phenom-
enologique de J.-P. Sartre," Lecons sur l'existentialism et ses 
formes principales, Troisieme PartIe~arIs: P. TeqtiI, 1948;;-
111-37. 
PART TWO 
THE HEANING OF THE FOR-ITSELF AS RELATION 
CHAPTER I 
THE SELF-RELATEDNESS OF THE FOR-ITSELF 
One frequently hears himself or others remark: "If only 
I could be myself," "I'm struggling with myself," or "I'm not 
myself today." Are such statements expressive of an ontologi-
cal structure lived by man or are they without ontological sig-
nificance? Opting for the former, Sartre claims that such re-
marks indicate that the For-itself always exists at a distance 
from itself in a relation of identity denied--an ontological 
structure that pervades human reality in multiple dimensions of 
engagement with itself. This Sartrean claim, however, reaffirms 
a radical distinction between the two regions of being, between 
the relational For-itself and the non-relational In-itself,l 
and thus seems to jeopardize the Sartrean view concerning the 
For-itself as the source of the categories of being as such. In 
order to decide, however, whether the For-itself, an insubstan-
tial relation, can bear the brunt of issuing categories applic-
able to a region of non-relational substance, the Sartrean 
lThough the non-relationality of the In-itself was ex-
pressed in our introductory remarks, this view is reaffirmed by 
Sartre's statement: "The principle of identity is the negation 
of every species of relation at the heart of being-in-itself." 
(BN, 77). 
-
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meaning of the For-itself qua relation must be explored from 
the dual stance of its self-relatedness, the concern of this 
chapter, and its relation to the world, the topic to be dealt 
with in the succeeding chapter. What, then, are the multiple 
dimensions of the For-itself's engagement with itself? 
Presence to self 
Sartre states: "The law of being of the for-itself, as 
the ontological foundation of consciousness, is to be itself in 
the form of presence to self.,,2 But what does Sartre mean by 
"presence to self'," the f'undamental intra-structure of the For-
itself? To illustrate, consider a man who is struggling with 
himself. That a struggle grips his entire being indicates a 
duality within the unity of' his consciousness, points to a re-
lation whereby he stands at a distance from the self which he 
wants to be in the mode of utter self-coincidence. His struggle 
to gain total identity with this self which he wants to ~, his 
desire to come to himself only serve to re-emphasize the dis-
tance at which he stands from himself within the unity of his 
being. The self which he wants to be, though indicative of him-
self as subject, thus represents only his way of not beias his 
own coincidence. Presence to self, then, implies a detachment 
in the subject related to himself--a fissure or a disintegration 
of coincidence within human reality--and thus defines the sub-
ject ~ subject, as other than In-itself. 
2 ,.,,.; BN_t ((. 
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But what separates the subject from himself in the case 
of presence to self? Nothing, answers Bartre. For to consider 
some thiAS as effecting tr~s separation would be to introduce 
into the subject an opacity which would shatter the unity and 
translucency of consciousness. In order to be subject, rather 
than a substantial In-itself, consciousness must then include 
within the unity of its being its own nothingness as the nihil-
ation of identity, of the absolute cohesiveness of the In-
itself. 3 
Reoted in the notion of presence to selt and further 
indicative of the radical contrast between the For-itself and 
the In-itself is, moreover, what Bartre terms "bad faith, II a 
lie to oneself, a lie within the unity of a single conscious-
ness. A typical example of bad faith, according to Bartre, is 
the attitude of a waiter who seeks to be a waiter as this table 
-
is a table. He assumes the role of a mechanical waiter, of an 
entity with a fixed and determined nature, and thereby runs 
from the reality of the free, unpredictable For-itself. He 
plays at being a waiter. But, by the mere fac't that he is 
playing a role, he places himself beyond that role. He thus 
reveals that he ~ a waiter in the only mode possible for human 
reality--in the mode of ~ being one. Human reality, in other 
words, defies consideration as being absolutely what it is. Or, 
as Bartre states, human reality flis a being which is what it is 
3 Cf. BN, 77-78. 
-
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not and which is not what it is, ,,4 a being which is governed by 
neither the principle of identi~ nor the principle of non-
contradiction, but rather by the law of presence to self, the 
perpetual disengagement of the self from itself. 
Considering the man in bad faith from another point of 
view, Bartre formulates the phenomenon of presence to selt in 
terms of a dyad: the reflecting-reflection dyad. The man in 
bad faith believes that he is a waiter in the same way a tree 
is a tree. He, moreover, has an immediate or non-thetic aware-
ness of this belief. Yet, while belief and consciousness (of) 
belief are immanent wi thin the un! ty of this man t s being, while 
these terms are mutually referent and dependent, belief and 
consciousness (of) belief are distinct. What separates them? 
Nothing, but that consciousness. For, Bartre maintains, the 
very structure of consciousness is to exist as a translucent 
consciousness of what it is not. As such, consciousness exists 
-
in the form of a reflecting-reflection dyad. In self-
consciousness, moreover, the terms of this dyad are so incapable 
of presenting themselves separately that the duality remains 
perpetually evanescent and each term, while positing itself for 
the other, becomes the other. If one attempts to grasp the 
reflection, in this case belief, the fissure reappears; if one 
attempts to grasp the reflecting, one finds only the reflection, 
belief. The reflecting, then, ~ the reflection, but as 
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presence to the reflection, as witness of the reflection, the 
reflecting constitutes itself as other than the reflection. 5 
Presence to self, in its various manifestations, hence 
expresses the disengagement of consciousness from itself. Con-
tinually constituting itself as B£i that of which it is con-
sciousness, consciousness--in the form of presence to self--
perpetually falls short of achieving the absolute coincidence, 
the cohesive identity, attributed by Sartre to the In-itself. 
But such is the being of the For-itself. As Sartre states: "It 
is the obligation for the for-itself never to exist except in 
the form of an elsewhere in relation to itself, to exist as a 
being which perpetually effects in itself a break in being. n6 
That the For-itself exists only "in the form of an elsewhere in 
relation to itself''' is thus the f'undamental meaning of presence 
to self. It is, moreover., indicative of a s~thesis of the sub-
ject and the self to which he stands, of' the reflecting and the 
reflection--a synthesis which, however, must be negative in that 
the subject stands to himself as not bei~ the self which he !! 
at an ideal distance from himself, in that the reflecting con-
stitutes itself as E2! the reflection which it~. As such a 
nihilating synthesis, the For-itself, in the form of presence 
to self, is hence a relation of denied identi~. 
5!¥!., 74-78. 
6BN 78. 
-' 
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The For-itself--Value Dyad 
Presence to self, Bartre claims, reveals that conscious-
ness, as a relation of denied identity, lacks coincidence with 
itself--or, is a lack of self. The existence of desire, more-
over, attests that human reality is lack. As lack, as desire,? 
the For-itself thus seeks completion, surpasses itself toward 
• But, toward what? 
Founding itself as consciousness by denying in relation 
to itself a certain mode of being, that of being-in-itself, 
human reality lacks the self from which it effects a perpetual 
nihilating withdrawal--the self as being-in-itself. This miss-
ing mode of In-itself, however, cannot be construed as a con-
crete, contingent In-itself. For, if consciousness were to 
coincide with such an In-itself, it would cease being conscious-
ness and would become a "thing." The In-itself which the For-
itself lacks, then, must be an absent In-itself, devoid of 
contingency, an In-itself which the For-itself can be while re-
taining its consciousness. Bartre thus asserts that the ideal 
being toward which human reality projects itself is a being 
which "would be its own foundation not as nothingness but as 
being and would preserve within it the necessary translucency 
of consciousness along with the coincidence with itself of 
?For Bartre, desire is consciousness, is a lack of 
beins-in-itself. Cf.![, 8?~8. 
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being-in-itself. n8 In other words, that toward which the For-
itself surpasses itself is the impossible synthesis: the In-
itself-For-itself. 
Claiming that man's hypostatization of this synthesis 
as a transcendence beyond human reality, as God, is a betrayal 
of its wholly immanent character, Sartre avers that this total-
ity has no priority over consciousness since the ideality of 
its being is dependent upon consciousness. But, neither does 
consciousness have priority over this ideal synthesis. For, 
Sartre points out, consciousness derives its very meaning as 
lack from the In-itself-For-itself. Interdependent and yet 
distinct, the In-itself-For-itself and the For-itself thus form 
a dyad at the heart of human reality. 
Because the In-itself-For-itself is non-thetically ap-
prehended as desirable, its being, moreover, is to be value. 
As Sartre states: 
Value is the self insofar as the self haunts the heart 
of the for-itself as that for which the for-itself is. 
The supreme value toward which consciousness at every 
8RN , 90. Inasmuch as consciousness depends in its 
being upon the In-itself which it reflects, consciousness must 
assume the contingency of the In-itself. Consciousness must 
exist on the surface of being-in-itself. "Eve~hi~ takes 
place as if the in-itself in a project to foun ts~f gave it-
sel? tEe modification of the for-itself." (![. 621) This In-
itself, nihilated in the For-itself, remains at the heart of 
the For-itself as its original contingency. The For-itself's 
necessary connection with the In-itself is termed its facticity. 
It is in an effort to escape its facticity, its contingency, 
that human reality seeks to become a being which would be its 
own reason for being, that is, a necessary being, the In-itself-
For-itself. 
instant surpasses itself by ita very being is the 
absolute being of the self with its characteristics 
of identity, of purity, of permanence, etc., and as 
its own foundation. 9 
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"Value is the self." Value is as the meaning of the For-itself; 
value is as an absent In-itself; value!! as given with the non-
thetic translucency of the For-itself. Yet, value, as forever 
unrealizable, !! B2i. The For-itself. in seeking the sub-
stantiality of the In-itself while retaining the translucidity 
of consciousness. thus relates to value as the ideal self which 
it !!--but in the mode of non-being, in a mode which is not that 
of being-in-itself. 
Inseparable and yet distinct, the For-itself and value 
hence form a dyad within the unity of human reality. Value, 
then, upsurges with the For-itself and only because there is a 
For-itself.10 But, while sustaining the ideal being of value, 
the For-itself is denied an actual attainment of the impossible 
synthesis: In-itself-For-itself. Though absent, value never-
theless qualifies the For-itself, makes an intrinsic difference 
9 BN, 93 • 
....... 
lOThat value arises with the For-itself and only because 
there is a For-itself represents the Sartrean thesis that the 
For-itself is the source of all determination. of all the cate-
gories of being. Though we are here concerned with the meaning 
of the For-itself as relation, such Sartrean manipulation of 
the For-itself should be noted. 
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to the being of the For-itself. For, it is via value that the 
For-itself non-thetically grasps itself as lack and hence en-
gages in the process of self-construction, a process terminated 
by death but never completed inasmuch as value is never real-
ized. The self-relation which is human reality in the form of 
the For-itself-value dyad is thus one of internal negation: 
value is :f.mmanent within human reality as an ideal being, but 
the For-itself is denied beipg value in the mode of an In-
ltsel.f. ll 
~ Possible ~ ~ Circuit 2f.. Selfness 
Sartre capitalizes on the For-itself as lack in still 
another way to mani.fest the self-relatedness of the For-itself. 
Each particular For-itself lacks a specific concrete reality 
which would constitute this For-itself as itself. Again, we 
ask, what is the nature of that which consciousness lacks? As 
a quarter moon lacks three-quarters of the moon which it is in 
- ----- --
order to be a full moon, so, too, Sartre maintains, the For-
itself lacks precisely the For-itself which it is in order to 
complete itself. In view of the ideal of coincidence with self, 
the For-itself which I lack, then, must be the For-itself which 
I am, not a strange For-itself. Nevertheless, I cannot be the 
llThough we have considered the For-itself-value dyad 
in an abstract fashion, Sartre avers that value is not merely a 
pure abstraction. Concrete consciousness always emerges with 
a situation. Cf. BN, 90-92. 
-
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For-itself which I lack in the mode of identity, otherwise I 
would lapse into In-itself. I, then, am the For-itself which 
I am not, which I lack, in the mode of having ~ be this For-
itself in order to attempt identification with it in the unity 
of the self. This particular For-itself which I am and yet 
lack constitutes a possible for me, a possible which accompan-
ies my upsurge into being as the nihilation of the In-itself, a 
way of being what I am--at a distance from se1f. 12 
Let us consider an example to elucidate the meaning of 
possibility. Even in writing this sentence here and now, there 
is consciousness (of) writing this work. The consciousness (of) 
writing this work refers me, not only to the pages written, 
but also to the pages unwritten. With the consciousness (of) 
writing this work emerges the consciousness (of) the completed 
product, my possibility. I am this consciousness (of) the com-
...... 
pleted work, not as a tree is a tree, but rather as B2iyet or 
at ~ distance from self. That distance £rom self qualifies 
possibility is indicative, moreover, of Bartra's position that 
onll consciousness has the structure of possibility and hence 
that only consciousness can issue posslbillties.l3 
l2BN, 95ff • 
....... 
l3The In-itself, as fullness, cannot have possibility 
as its immediate structure. The possibilities attributed to 
the In-itself have consciousness as their source. Again, the 
Sartrean For-itself is called upon to issue a category of being 
as such. 
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One may question, however, whether the For-itself does 
not achieve coincidence with the lacking For-itself when the 
il·11 
I·.il':.' 1 I ,.' 
'r 
1.'li 
,', 
latter is realized. Consider again the example. The conscious- fl 
ness (of) the completed work as realized is itself a For-itself. 
Emerging with this realized consciousness, then, is another 
horizon of possibilities--the possibility of a sequel, the pos-
sibility of publication. The realized consciousness thus up-
surges with a possible which it !! as E21 yet and hence lacks. 
Consoiousness, then, always falls short of realizing the ulti-
mate value whioh it intends by realizing its possibles. But 
what separates the For-itself from the For-itself lacked? 
The separation, in one sense, is effected by a nothing-
ness which slips in between the For-itself and its possible. 
For, non-thetically conscious of the possible. the For-itself 
constitutes itself as E21 the possible whioh it is. Yet, in 
another sense, the separation is eftected by the totality of 
existents in the world, for the possible arises as a presence 
to a particular state of affairs. To revert to our example, 
the possibility ot publication arises as presence to the con-
crete situation concerning the market tor such a work, the 
publisher's opinion and so on. In the etfort to seek coinci-
dence.with this possible, one must thus traverse the existents 
in the world. 
Sartre terms this relation of the For-itself with its 
possible the "circuit ot selfness." What, however, does he 
mean by the term "selfness"? 
Selfness represents a degree of nihilation carried 
further than the pure presence to itself of the pre-
reflective cogito--in the sense that the possible 
which I am is not pure presence to the for-itself 
as reflection to reflecting, but that it is absent-
~resence. Due to this fact the existence of ref-
erence as a structure of bting in the for-itself is 
still more clearly marked.14 
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Wielding again the nihilating activity of consciousness, Sartre 
composes contrapuntally another variation on the theme of self-
relatedness. Having heard the variations of the For-itself's 
relation with pure presence (reflection) and with pure absence 
(value), we are introduced to the For-itself's relation with 
absent-presence (possibility). But, precisely, what is the 
structure of the relation of the For-itself with its possible, 
the lacking For-itself? 
The For-itself which I am as presence to self and the 
For-itself which I am but lack as an absent-presence to self 
are the terms ot this relation considered abstractly.15 But 
the terms themselves have the status of relation. For the 
l4BN, 103. Sartre repudiates any attempt to identify 
selfness WIth the Ego which is of the nature of In-itself within 
the Sart~aan perspective. Ct. 1[, 102-103. 
l5The delineation of specific relations of the For-
itself is an abstract consideration in that the For-itself can-
not be considered as an independent term entering into a rela-
tion, save through abstraction. But the For-itself exists its 
ontological dimensions simultaneously. More will be said about 
this later. 
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For-itself which I am as presence to self is relation and the 
For-itself which I am yet lack is relation as an absent-presence 
to self. The relation of the For-itself with its possible is 
thus a relation relating ~ relations which ~ denied ~ 
identity 2! being-in-itself. This marked play on relation hence 
serves Bartre's purpose to evince the referential structure of 
the For-itself and its radical distinction from the In-itself, 
but does it serve his employment of the For-itself as the source 
of categories of being? 
That a tension is developing within the Bartrean uystem 
concerning the preceding question is evinced, moreover, in that 
Bartre's handling of the For-itself's relation to its possible 
reveals transcendence at the heart of jmmanence. Not only is 
there within the For-itself a going out toward value and possi-
bilities, but there is also a projection toward objects in the 
world, objects which must be traversed in order to realize any 
given possible. In virtue of its transcendence, then, the For-
itself refuses the self-containment, the substantial limits of 
the In-itself and, Bartre avers, the instantaneous Cartesian 
cogito. Bound to the meaning of the For-itself's transcendence 
and its refusal of such substantiality is thus the Sartrean 
notion of the For-itself's temporality.16 
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TemporaliY: 
Viewing temporality as a dynamic synthesis of past, 
present and future, Sartre seeks to show that temporality is 
the being of the For-itself.17 Approaching an examination of 
time by considering the type of relation obtaining between the 
past and the present, Bartre points to the irreversibility of 
the temporal dimensions as evidence of an internal relation. 
That the past and present, together with the future, involve 
such a relation, moreover, excludes the non-relational In-
itself trom temporal dimensionality. For relationality demands 
a distance excluded from the region of the absolutely cohesive 
In-itselt. 18 As Bartre says regarding the past, there can be 
a "past only tor a present which cannot exist without being its 
past--back there, behind itselt. n19 In other words, there can 
be a past only tor the For-itselt, since only the For-itself is 
at a distance trom selt. 20 
l7For Bartre's opposition to treating time as a series 
of externally related "nows," cf. BN, 107-13; 130-36. Sartre's 
intention to evince that temporalitY is the being of the For-
itselt is ultimately an intention to show that temporality 
comes to the world through the For-itselt, that the For-itself 
is the source ot -the time ot the world. 
18A certain temporality will come to rest upon the 
region at the In-itselt, but only through the intentional ac-
tivity of the For-itself. This point will be considered in 
Chapter II ot Part III. 
19!!!" 114. 
20As will be discussed, Sartre considers the present as 
the being of the For-itself. 
", 
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Though distance qualifies the For-itself's relation to 
its past, the For-itself, Bartre maintains, must nevertheless be 
its past. Or, there would be no ontological foundation for such 
phenomena as bearing responsibility for past actions, as sus-
taining in some way the being which I !!!!., that is, my essence, 
the consummated possibles which define me. But, while I must 
be my past, my past is behind me, is fixed, congealed or, as 
Bartre states, my "past is substance,"2l is In-itself. I must 
then be my past, but not in the mode of identity of being-in-
itself or I would lapse into In-itself. In other words, though 
the "relation of being which I have to sustain with the past is 
a relation of the type of the in-itself--that is, an identifi-
cation with itself,"22 I nevertheless am not my past, for I !!!!. 
it. As Bartre expresses this paradoxical situation: 
If already I am. no longer what I was, it is still 
necessary that I have to be so in the unity of a 
nihilating synthesis which I myself sustain in 
being, otherwise I would have no relation of any 
sort with what I am no longer, and my full posi-
tivity would be exclusive of the non-being essential 
to becom1ng.2~ 
In virtue of its very structure, then, the For-itself is always 
beyond its past. But the very nihilating activity in terms of 
which the For-itself surpasses its past also binds the 
21BN 
-' 
119. 
22BN 
-' 
116. 
2~BN 
-' 
117. 
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For-itself to its past in a relation 2! identity denied. That 
this is a case of identity is evinced by the fact that the past 
is the For-itself become In-itself;24 that this identity is 
denied the type of identity of the In-itself is secured by the 
nihilating activity which is the For-itself. 
Unlike the past, the present is For-itself. On the 
basis of the "ontological proof," the fundamental meaning of the 
present for Bartre is grounded in the notion of presence: the 
presence of the For-itself to being-in-itself. Concerning 
presence, Bartre asserts: "Presence to __ indicates existence 
outside oneself near to __ ,"25 involves an internal relation 
between the being which is present (the For-itself) and the 
being to which it is present (the In-itself). In terms of in-
tentionality, the For-itself's presence, moreover, involves the 
For-itself non-thetically witnessing itself in the presence of 
a being as !!2.! being that being. In other words, presence to 
__ expresses the For-itself's internal relation with being-in-
itself as the nih11ation of the In-itself. The present, as 
presence to __ , as For-itself. then. !!E2i. As Bartre states: 
"It makes itself present in the form of a flight. • •• It is 
24The past is indicative of the For-itself's facticity, 
that is, of its necessar,y connection with the In-itself. In 
terms of facticity, a type of identity, other than the identity 
of being-in-itself, can be predicated of the Bartrean cosito. 
But this will be considered in Chapter I ot Part III. 
2~, 121. 
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a flight outside of co-present being and from the being which it 
was toward the being which it will be."26 The present thus 
refers not only to the past, but also to the future. 
As revealed in the relation ot the For-itself with its 
possible, the For-itself is a being which transcends itself 
toward __ , a being which comes to itself in terms of the tu~ure, 
a present which is a flight toward the For-itself which it 
lacks, toward its possible. The future is then a mo~e of the 
For-itself's being, a mode which non-thetically brings meaning 
to the present. The future stands to the present as that com-
plement ot the For-itself which would secure self-coincidence, 
but a complement which remains at a distance from self. The 
future, in other words, is that which the For-itself ~t but 
~let. The For-itselt·s project toward the future which it 
is, project toward self-coincidence, however, can never succeed, 
since the future slips into the past and a new !uture--a new 
possible--arises on the horizon as pI"eSenCe to co-future being.2 
But what can be said of the For-itself as relation in the con-
_.;;;;..;;;.;;;;;.;;.;0.= ......... 
text of temporality? 
An intra-structure of the For-itself, temporality "is 
the being of the For-itself insofar as the For-itself has to be 
its being ekstatically.,,28 The For-itself is a nihilating 
26g, 123. 
27 Of. .m!, 124-29. 
281!!., 136. 
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transcendence suspended between modes of its being, but sus-
pended dynamically so as to issue the synthesis of the temporal 
dimensions which it holds in separation. 29 The For-itself, 
hence, is what it is not (its past) and is not what it is (its 
tuture). As present, it enters into the terms of past and 
future, sustaining their being and yet constituting itself as 
present by retusing the mode of identity of being-in-itself wit 
its terms. Neither the terms of past and future nor the For-
itself as present, then, can exist in isolation from one an-
other. The relation which is For-itself is thus decidedly an 
internal relation in that the For-itself as present determines 
itself in terms of its flight from the past and projection 
toward the future. Such internality, however, ought not to be 
construed as an importation of past and future into the Por-
itself as present. For the For-itself as relation, in the con-
text of temporality, is: t~efore itself, behind itself: never 
itself. n30 An internal relation 2! identity denied, the 
29Temporality, while an intra-structure of the For-
itself, is also the source of the meaning of "horizontal" 
transcendence, of the For-itselt's relation with being-in-
itself. The present as For-itself is bound not only to its past (which the For-itself sustains even though the past has the 
character of In-itself), but also to the co-present region of 
the In-itself. Such "horizontal" transcendence is further mani-
fested to a limited extent in the present's relation with the 
future, since the future is a presence to a co-future region of 
In-itself. But an explicit consideration of the For-itself's 
horizontal transcendence is the concern of the following chapter 
30~, 141. 
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For-itself--as temporality--once more reveals that its being is 
a refusal of the self-identity ~~ In-itself, of the sub-
stantiality 2!~ In-itself. 
Reflection 
In considering the thetic consciousness of enduring and 
its relation to non-thetic temporality, Sartre discusses the 
nature and the laws of reflection--a discussion which concerns 
us primarily since it reveals another self-relation of the For-
itself. "Reflection," Sartre states, "is the For-itself con-
scious of itself.,,3l The reflective consciousness and the con-
sciousness reflected-on, however, cannot be fundamentally re-
lated in terms of a thinking subject perceiving an object. For 
to grant such independence in being to consciousness would be 
to eradicate the type of internal relation requisite for knowl-
edge and to lapse into the Cartesian substantialist illusion. 
Thus, "reflection must be united to that which is reflected-on 
by a bond of being,"32 and yet the reflected-on must be dis-
tinct from the reflective as object and subject are distinct. 
The familiar ontological structure of the Sartrean For-itself 
again becomes apparent: the reflective consciousness must both 
be and not be the consciousness retlected-on. 
3lmt, 150. 
32BN 151. 
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Regarding reflection, Sartre maintains that, while the 
reflective and the reflected-on tend toward independence (un-
like the reflecting-reflection dyad), neither can achieve in-
dependence. For, the reflective non-thetically witnesses its 
own being only through the appearance of the reflected-on and 
the reflected-on, altered by reflection, non-thetically wit-
nesses itself as having an outside, as tending toward object, 
only through its dependence upon the reflective. 33 Thus, the 
operation of reflection reveals a totality of reflective and 
reflected-on as a unitary structure of a being which issues a 
nothingness forever separating these terms, while holding them 
in unity. In the case ot reflection, however, both terms are 
in the form of the reflecting-reflection dyad, that is, in the 
form of presence to self. Hence, the separation between the 
reflective and the reflected-on manifests that reflection is 
a nihilation of the For-itself. But, how can this be? 
By means of reflection the For-itself attempts to "be 
for itself what it is.,.34 According to Sartre, this involves a 
33The ideal pole of the nihilation constituting re-
flection is an external negation, a scissiparity which would 
render the reflected-on as In-itself. This scissiparity, how-
ever, is stifled by the fact that the reflected-on has to be 
the reflective and vice versa. Only in the For-itself's re-
lation to the Other is the sciSSiparity ettected--as will be 
seen in the next chapter. 
34u, 153. 
-
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dual endeavor, an endeavor to achieve objectification and in-
teriorization: to be for itself an object-in-itself, an object 
which is the subject as it~. But the project to grasp itself 
in the mode of self-coincidence is doomed to failure, since the 
reco'Very of the being which is lost requires a recovery in the 
mode of its own being, that is, in the mode of the For-itself, 
thus of flight. As Sartre states, it is this failure which is 
constitutive of reflection. 
This turning back upon the selt is a wrenching away 
from self in order to return to it. • •• For the 
necessary structure of the for-itself requires that 
its being can be recovered only by a being which it-
self exists in the form of for-itself. Thus the 
being which effects the recovery must be constituted 
in the mode of the for-itself, and the being which 
is to be recovered must exist as tor-itself. And 
these two beings must be the same beiIt. But ex-
actly insofar as this being recovers self, it 
causes an absolute distance to exi~t between itself 
~ itsel!--in the unity of being.'5 
The project of the For-itself to achieve substantiality ~ 
reflection thus serves only to fling the For-itself back upon 
itself as non-substantiality, as relation--as a refusal of the 
self-coincidence of the Sartrean In-itself and the Cartesian 
cosito. 
In its relation with temporality, however, reflection 
may be pure or impure. In pure reflection, "the simple presence 
of the reflective for-itself to the for-itself reflected-on.,,36 
35mt• 154. 
36mt• 155. 
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the reflective has to be the reflected-on in complete immanence 
and yet without being In-itself. Because of such immanence, 
moreover, reflection must be a peculiar type of knowledge. For, 
while knowledge involves making oneself other and thereby deny-
ing that one is the other, the unity of being of the reflective 
and the reflected-on precludes such a total detachment of the 
reflective from the reflected-on, as does the very motivation of 
refleotion--to achieve the coincidence of the reflective For-
itself and the For-itself reflected-on. Hence, Sartre claims, 
pure reflection is a lightning recognition rather than knowl-
edge in the strict sense. 37 
The lightning character of this recognition, however, 
does not mean that the reflective and the reflected-on are in-
stantaneous; each qua For-itself is in diasporatic fashion the 
temporal dimensions. In fact, it is in terms of the past and 
the future that the reflected-on is distinguished from the re-
flective within the unity of being-far-itself. For when one 
makes any reflective statement: I think, I doubt, one is al-
ready ahead of oneself in the future. The reflective is always 
presented as ahead of the retlected-on, thereby precluding the 
attainment of the absolute self-coincidence or the In-itselt. 
As Bartre asserts in maintaining that pure reflection is con-
soiousness of the three ekstatic dimensions: "Pure reflection 
37 Cf. ![, 155-57. 
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still discovers temporality only in its own original non-
substantiality, in its refusal to be In-itself. u38 Pure re-
flection. then, while doing no violence to original temporality, 
fails to achieve the project of the reflective consciousness, 
the project from which the very meaning of reflection is 
derived: to be For-itself as the In-itself Is. 
Impure reflection, though having pure reflection as its· 
original structure, yields, however, only a succession of 
psychic states. Defined as "the apprehension of the reflacted-
on as in-itselt in a circuit of saltness in which reflection 
stands in immediate relation with an in-itself which it has to 
be."39 impure reflection, in contrast to the pure form, has 
three terms: the reflective, the reflected-on and an In-itself. 
For, in seeking to grasp the reflected-on as In-itself, the re-
flective takes a point of view on it, posits itself as ~ 
being the reflected-on and thereby effects the appearance of an 
In-itself as a shadowy being of the reflected-on. By effecting 
the appearance of an In-itself engulfing the reflected-on, im-
pure reflection, however. does violence to the non-substantial 
historicity of the reflected-on and thereby manifests itself as 
bad faith. For, while there is a declaration that the re-
flective 1s not the reflected-on, impure reflection still seeks 
to make itself the object, the reflected-on as In-itself. 
3~i. 158. 
39BN: 160 • 
....... 
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Hence, Sartre states, "impure reflection is an abortive effort 
on the part of the for-itself to ~ another while remainiB5 
itself."40 To view oneself from the outside within the unity 
of one's being, to grasp oneself as what one is in the mode of 
coin.cidence, thus remains forever impossible. 
Reflection, whether pure or impure, hence reveals the 
failure of the For-itself's project to attain the substantial-
ity of being-in-itself. For the reflective, remaining always 
ahead of the reflected-on, causes an absolute distance between 
itself and the self-reflected-on and thus denies of itself the 
mode of identity of being-in-itself.41 The self-relation which 
is reflection, then. manifests the For-itself as ~ relation 2! 
internal negation, 2! identity denied. 
SUlDJD!ll'Y 
Having examined the various self-relations of the For-
itself. are we now in a position to declare the significance of 
Bartre's statement: "The For-itself 1s relation"? Are we now 
in a position to pinpoint the meaning of the For-itself as a 
"relation of internal negation." as a "relation of identity 
denied"? A capsule summary of our results seems indispensable 
40g" 161. 
4lBecause the reflective consciousness is always ahead 
of the consciousness reflected-on, Bartre avers that the Car-
tesian cOfito might rather be formulated: "I think; therefore 
I was." C • !N, 119. 
-
to ascertaining our stance. 42 
Presence to self reveals the For-itself as the synthesis 
of the reflecting-reflection dyad, a dyad constitutive of the 
being of the For-itself as the foundation of its nothingness, 
as its original intra-structure. That this relation is internal 
is manifested by the fact that the For-itself qua For-itself 
would vanish without the dyad. That a dyad is held within the 
unity of being-for-itself discloses, however, a distance within 
the For-itself: the ideal distance at which the reflection 
stands from the reflecting. In virtue of this distance, in 
virtue of the distinction of its terms, the For-itself is thus 
denied the identity of being-in-i tself • As pr.3sence to self, 
the For-itself is hence an internal relation of identity denied: 
an internal relation as the synthesis of the reflecting-
reflection dyad constitutive of its being, identity denied as 
the denial of the identity of the In-itself. Inasmuch as the 
reflecting constitutes itself as not the reflection which it is, 
inasmuch as the subject stands to himself as not the self which 
42In delineating the diverse self-relations of the For-
itself, it is necessary to keep in mind that the consideration 
is an abstract one, as noted previously (above 41, n. 15). In 
the cohesive Sartrean ontology, no one ontological dimension of 
the For-itself stands alone; the For-itself can exist only if 
all its d;~nsions are sustained. But while the existent For-
itself refuses consideration as an independent term of any of 
its self-relations, to differentiate these relations and yet 
find a cocmon threD.d of meani!Lg among them, it is necessary to 
treat the For-itself under one aspect as a term of a relation 
which is For-itself trom another point of view. 
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he is at an ideal distance, the For-itself--as presence to 
,self--however, is not a denial of identity per.!.2.: the re-
flecting is not the reflection which it is in the sense that it 
is not what it is in the mode of identity of being-in-itself. 
Constructed upon the relation of presence to self--a 
relation revealing the For-itself as lacking the substantiality 
of the In-itself--is the For-itself--value dyad. Upsurging with 
the For-itself, as presence to self, as lack, is an absent In-
itself, the lacked. Because the For-itself is qualified at the 
heart of its being by the absent In-itself' and exists only in 
relation to that elsewhere which it is denied by absence, the 
relation which the For-itself is in the form o~ the For-itself-
value dyad is decidedly an internal relation, a relation con-
stituti've of the being of the For-itself. That the For-itself 
fails to achieve a synthesis with the absent In-itself, to 
~ attain value, indicates, moreover, a distance between the terms 
of this dyad. Thus, again, the For-itself manifests itself as 
• ~ an internal relation of j.dentity denied. A refusal of the mode 
I of identity of being-in-itself, the For-itself, however, is not 
to be construed as a refusal of identity per~: for, the For-
itself in the form of the For-itself-value dyad encloses value 
within its being and hence ~ value, the ideal which qualifies 
its every action, but not in the mode of' identity of the In-
:Ltsel.t. 
A relation relating two relations, the For-itself-
possible rel~~~ has as its terms the For-itself which I am 
as presence to self and the For-itself which I ~ but lack as 
an absent-presence to self. In its effort to attain the self-
coincidence of the In-itself, the term For-itself requires 
coincidence with a For-itself which it is, as absent: the For-
itself which is its possible. 43 This absent For-itself qual-
ifies the For-itself at the heart of its being inasmuch as the 
For-itself, as presence to self, non-thetically grasps its 
possible, thereby constitutes itself as not that possible which 
it is and hence as a perpetual flight toward it. That the For-
itself perpetually determines its~lf in relation to its possible 
thus reveals that the For-itself-po£sible relation is an in-
ternal relatj.on. That the For-itself can never achieve abso-
lute coincidence with its absent For-itself, however, reveals 
that the For-itself again is denied the type of identity of 
being-in-itself. Nevertheless a type of identity pervades the 
For-itself-possible structure, since the possible to which the 
For-itself relates is !![ possible, since I call a certain 
possible mine. Thus, the For-itself, as an internal relation 
43In that the effort of the For-itself to achieve coin-
cidence with its absent For-itself is ultimately an effort to 
gain substantiality, that 1s, the being of the In-itself which 
is absent, the For-itself-value dyad is implied as a presup-
position for ~he analysis ot the For-itself-poss1ble relation--
a presupposition pointing to the cohes1ve character of Bartre's 
ontology. 
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of identity denied, is a refusal only of the identity of being-
in-itself. 
Te!porality, too, is viewed by Sartre as a relation of 
identity denied. The dimensions of temporality pose a problem, 
however, in that the past is In-itself and the future "is not 
~ itself and neither is it in the mode of being of the For-
itself, since it is the meanipg of the For-itself.,,44 Conse-
quently, the past and the future are forever separated from the 
For-itself as present. Yet, the For-itself as present, as 
flight, requires at the heart of its being the past from which 
it flees and the future toward which it projects. The para-
doxical being of the For-itself again emerges. An internal 
relation denying of itself the mode of identity of the In-
itself, the For-itself, as temporality, has to be its being 
ekstatically, while maintaining some type of identity of it-
self as present with its past and future. 
In the case of reflection, the For-itself, as the bond 
of the reflective consciousness and the consciousness re-
flected-on, manifests still again its structure as an internal 
relation denied the mode of identity of being-in-itself. For, 
44g, 129. The self-relations of the For-itself pre-
viously revIewed Sartre considers immediate structures of the 
For-itself. Temporality, however, is not an immediate struc-
ture ot the For-itselt. For the past as In-itself remains 
outside the For--itselt even though the latter gives itself as 
beIng Its past in the mode ot non-identity. The relation ot 
the For-itself as present to its past is thus highly problem-
atic as a selt-relation. 
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while the reflective must be the reflected-on, the reflective 
is always ahead of the reflected-on, thereby precluding its 
goal of attaining coincidence with the reflected-on, of grasp-
ing itself as what it is. That the reflective is ahead of the 
reflected-on means, moreover, that the reflected-on must be in 
the past, held as a quasi-ob~ect, as quasi-outside the For-
itselt. The problem here, as with non-thetic temporality, is 
the character of the past as In-itself, together with Bartre's 
claim that the reflective is the retlected-on in complete im-
manence, though not in the mode of identity of being-in-
itself.45 This problematic concerning the relation of the For-
itself to its past, of the reflective to the reflected-on, 
reveals, however, a fundamental Bartrean thesis regarding the 
structure of the For-itself. But, before the implications of 
this problem are considered, it would be well to formulate the 
meaning of the For-itselt ~ relation as revealed by the var-
ious selt-relations of the For-itself and to elucidate the 
bearing of this formulation upon the further questions con-
cerning substantialization and the ability of the For-itself to 
introduce categories of being. 
45The problem of immanence, coupled with the In-itself 
character of the past, becomes even more acute in impure re-
flection wherein a shadowy In-itself appears. But more will be 
said concerning this problem in a later context. 
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That the For-itself is an internal relation of identity 
denied has been manifested in each of the self-relations ex-
amined. By formulating the various structures of the For-itself 
in terms of relation, Sartre has sought to emphasize the For-
itself's "own original non-substantiality, ••• its refusal to 
be In-itself. ,,46 Pushing ahead his distinction between the two 
regions of being, he further expresses the structure of the For-
itself as a relation denied the identity of being-in-itself. 
Thus, the phrase--"internal relation of identity deniedn--as 
predicated of the Sartrean For-itself appears to signify that 
being-tor-itselt has neither the identity nor the substantial-
i~~ of being-in-itself. 
But, while stressing a radical differentiation between 
the two regions of being, the Sartrean handling of the For-
itselt's self-relations sets the ontological stage for his util-
izing the For-itself as the source of such categories as value, 
possibility and temporality. It would appear, however, that 
Sartre's consideration of the For-itself as an internal rela-
tion of 1dent1ty denied would continue to jeopardize his assign-
ment of this ontological task to the For-itself. Yet, the self-
relations examined reveal a ver,y interesting point with respect 
to this problem. For, in dealing with these self-relations, 
Sartra has clearly expressed that the For-itself ~ the self to 
4~, 158. 
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which it is present, ![ the value which it seeks, ~ the pos-
sible which it attempts to realize, that the For-itself as 
present ~ its past and its future, that the reflective is the 
reflected-on--~.Ee.i !a. ~ mode 2! identi:tY; 2!. being-in-
itself. This suggests, as does the very notion of self-
relation, that the For-itself has a type of identity with it-
self, though not the same type of identity as the In-itself. 
In other words, Bartre appears to have employed an analogical 
concept of identity, though he himself makes no explicit avowal 
of an employment of analogy and indeed seems to disavow it by 
claiming the principle of identity as a regional principle 
governing only the In-itself. The appearance of analogy, how-
ever, suggests that Bartre may have substantialized the For-
itself in an analogous sense, while maintaining its refusal of 
the In-itself's substantiality. If this is the case, then, 
perhaps Bartre can maintain a differentiation between the For-
itself and the In-itself and still justifiably claim the For-
itself as the sources of categories of being qua being. But, 
before the question of substantialization can be considered in 
depth, the implications of the problem regarding the relation 
of the For-itself to its past, of the reflective to the 
retlected-on, must be elucidated. 
That the :For-itselt, within the unity of its being, 
relates to its past, an In-itselt, points to a more fundamental 
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relation which the For-itself is, a relation which 'undercuts the 
various self-relations of the For-itself. As evinced in the 
Sartrean "ontological proof," the For-itself exists funda-
mentally as a relation to In-itself. In other words, the For-
itself cannot be contained within the arena of self-relations; 
the For·-itself' escapes such bounds; the For-itself goes outside 
self' an manifested by its circuit of selfness, as manifested 
by what was termed its "horizontal" transcendence. It is this 
engagement in the world that must be examined. then, before the 
meaning of the For-itself qua relation can be explicated fully 
and the issue of substantializatlon taken up. 
CHAPl'ER II 
THE RELATIONS OF THE FOR-ITSELF IN THE WORLD 
The self-relations of the For-itself indicated its re-
lation to beings other than itself. The discussion of the 
circuit of selfness and of the present as presence to being-
in-itself explicitly pOinted to what we termed the For-itself's 
t1horizontaltl transcendence, its engagement in the world. To 
adequately discern the meaning of the For-itself as relation, 
we are thus bound, as Sartre asserts, "to describe the relations 
of the for-itself with the in-itself inasmuch as these are 
constitutive of the very being of the for-itself."l In this 
context, knowledge, as well as dOing and having, come under 
consideration. 2 But there are two other relations which enter 
into a discussion of the For-itself's relation with the world: 
the For-itself's relation with other consciousnessesand the 
l,!!!, 172. 
2The For-itself has other relations with the In-itself 
in terms of its issuing the categories of being, but these 
arise on the foundation of knowledge and need not be considered 
in this context. These other relations, however, will be 
treated in Chapter II of Part Three, but from the standpoint of 
evincing whether the For-itself can bear the metaphysical 
burden of issuing categories of being. 
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For-itself's relation with its body.3 That these relations of 
the engaged For-itself are indicative of the For-itself's fun-
damental "elsewhere" and/or its refusal of the substantiality 
of the In-itself is the Bartrean thesis. 
Knowledge 
Viewing deduction and discursive argumentation as tools 
leading to knowledge, Bartre claims immediacy as the key to 
knowledge and declares all knowledge intuitive. By defining 
intuition as "the presence of consciousness to the thing,"4 he 
strategically equates knowledge with the being of the For-
itself as a relation to In-itself. Although the "ontological 
proof" and the consideration of the present have already man-
ifested this fundamental relation of the For-itself, Bartre 
seeks to show the For-itself's refusal of the self-containment 
of the In-itself in a more pointed manner--by establishing that 
the basic intra-structure of the For-itself, presence to self, 
demands the presence of consciousness to In-itself, demands 
knowledge as the be ips of the For-itself. 
3The ~ustification for considering the relation of the 
For-itself to its body in this context rather than as a mani-
festation of the For-itself's self-relatedness rests with the 
fact that the body is the For-itself's point of insertion in 
the ~orld and that Bartre himself does not consider the For-
itself-body relation in his discussion of the structure of the 
For-itself itself. 
~, 172. 
64 
Pointing to the evanescence and mutual nihilating of 
the terms of the presence to self relation, of the reflecting-
reflection dyad, Bartre asserts that the For-itself can be 
saved from vanishing only if the reflection be "a relation to 
an outside which it is not"5_-as a mirror qua reflecting and 
its reflection can be maintained only if the reflection relates 
to something outside which it is not. The very being of the 
For-itself as presence to self thus requires a relation to that 
which it is ~, to the In-itself. As presence to In-itself, 
the For-itself, moreover, is knowledge, "the very being of the 
for-itself insofar as the for-itself has to be its being by 
making itself not to be a certain thing to which it is 
present. u6 Knowledge, as the being ot the For-itself, is thus 
a relation of For-itself to In-itself. But what type ot re-
lation is knowledge? 
That knowledge is a negative relation is evinced by 
the fact that consciousness does not lapse into the In-itself 
to which it is present. A negation, however, may be either 
external or internal. For example, to say "This pen is not a 
pencil" is to place oneself as a witness present to two beings 
which are bound in a purely external way by means of such wit-
nessing; neither the pen nor the pencil is altered by such a 
5 ![, 173. 
~, 174. 
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bond. But if one were to say "I am not well," the negation in-
volves neither an independence in being of the terms nor a 
third being, a witness, through whom the relation arises; more-
over, one is indicating that "not being well" is a negative, 
though real, quality of his being, a quality affecting his dis-
position and so on. This latter example thus illustrates an 
internal negation: a negation in terms of which the For-itself 
qualifies itself by what it is not and thereby alters its very 
being. That knowledge is ~ internal negation is Sartre's 
claim. 
Prior to pursuing the significance of knowledge as an 
internal negation, it would be well, however, to consider 
Sartre's statement on the meaning of an internal negation. 
In the case of an internal negation • • • it is within 
and upon the being which it is not that the for-itself 
appears as not being what it is not. In this sense 
the internal negation is a concrete ontological bond. 
• •• In the internal negation the for-itself col-
lapses on what it denies. The qualities denied are 
precisely those to which the for-itself is most 
present; it is from them that it derives its negative 
force and perpetually renews it. In this sense it is 
necessary to see the denied qualities as a constitu-
tive factor of the being of the for-itself? tor the 
for-itself must be there outside itself upon them; 
it must be they in order to deny that it is they. In 
sho'rt the term of origin of the internal negation is 
the in-itself, the thing which is there, and outside 
of it there is nothing except anemptiness, a nothing-
ness which is distinguished from the thing only by a 
pure negation for which this thing furnishes the very 
content. 7 
7 
.!!!i, 176. 
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What, then, is the Sartrean meaning for the For-itself as "in-
ternal negation"? In Sartre's terminology, we might say, the 
For-itself, as internal negation, must be the In-itself to which 
it is present, not in the mode of being-in-itself, but rather 
in the mode of non-being, that is, in its own peculiar mode of 
being. Or, the For-itself exists only in relation to the In-
itself to which it is present, but exists qua For-itself only 
by constituting itself as not that In-itself. Or, still again, 
the For-itself exists outside itself in the In-itself to which 
it is present. But what do such statements mean? Simply, that 
the For-itself, as presence to In-itself, as knowledge, as in-
ternal negation, cannot exist ~~mode ot ~ In-itselt's 
radical selt-containment. Man is a being-in-the-world. Con-
sciousness is presence-to-In-1tselt. Man determines himself in 
relation to his world; the For-itselt grasps itself as lack 
and engages in the task of self-construction in relation to the 
region of In-itself. To consider man apart from the world, 
to consider consciousness apart from the In-itself is a hopeless 
abstraction as seen in the case of the substantial cogito of 
Descartes. But, while the For-itself depends in its being upon 
the In-itself, it does not exist as In-itself. Hence the For-
itself is a relation of internal negation; presence to In-
itself, knowledge, is the fundamental bond of the For-itself 
to the In-itself and it is a bond of being. 
This bond, however, is not to be understood as the 
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For-itself's relation to a lack or an absence. For, Sartre 
points out, in knowledge, considered as an ontological bond of 
being, the For-itself is present to the absolute plenitude of 
the contingent In-itself, not an absent In-itself. In fact, it 
is the For-itself which is the lack, the absence, which deter-
mines itself in existence from the perspective of this pleni-
tude. In knowledge, then, the only being encountered is the 
known, the massive In-itself. But, if the bond of the For-
itself to the In-itself cannot be understood in terms of the 
For-itself's relation to an absence or lack, neither can it be 
understood as continuity or discontinuity. For, Sartre asserts, 
the supposition of an intermediary term in the notion of con-
tinuity and the sUbstantialization of the nothing separating 
two discontinuous elements preclude the immediacy of the rela-
tion of the For-itself to the In-itself evinced in intuition. 
How, then, are we to understand the ontological bond which is 
knowledge? Sartre answers: "It is pure denied identity.n8 
To illustrate this conclusion, he considers two tangen-
tial curves. If the curves were hidden, save for the length of 
their tangency, it would be impossible to distinguish them. 
Here, then, there is only pure identity. But, if one were to 
view the curves in their entirety and reconstitute the movement 
which made them, each is seen as the negation of the other. The 
~, 178. 
curves are apprehended as two, but with no distance between 
them. Thus, the pure identity is denied. 
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Though Sartre's illustration leaves something to be 
desired,9 the notion of the curves being distinct, though with-
out distance, is meaningful for the being of the For-itself as 
knowledge. For, in knowledge, there is no distance between con-
sciousness and the known; consciousness is the known. Yet, 
there is a distinction between them in that consciousness cannot 
simply be what it knows. For, while the ideal of knowledge is 
being-what-one-knows, the structure of the For-itself, as mani-
fested in the reflecting-reflection dyad, is fundamentally not-
being-what-is-known. 10 The For-itself, as knowledge, is thus a 
relation to In-itself, a relation whereby consciousness ~ the 
known In-itself, but E2i in the mode of being-in-Itself. 
The ontological significance of Sartre's discussion of 
knowledge, as it bears upon the question of the meaning of the 
For-itself qua relation, lies, however, in his claim concerning 
the intrinsic dependence of the For-itself upon the In-itself. 
For such dependence precludes the For-itself existing in the 
9First of all, the two curves could exist in isolation, 
which is not the case with the For-itself whose very being de-
pends upon the In-itself. Secondly, the dual nihilating im-
plied in the case of the curves misrepresents the ontological 
structure of the In-itself, which ot itself simply is; only the 
For-itself nihilates. --
10Cf. ![. 218. 
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mode of radical self-containment, self-completion attributed by 
Sartra to "substance," to the region of In-itself. Hence, it 
~ basically in virtue 2!~ For-itself's intrinsic dependence 
upon In-itself that Sartre designates ~ For-itself "relation," 
rather than tt.substance. II 
Doing, Having ~ Being 
As manifested in the discussion of knowledge, the For-
itself, in virtue of its perpetual nihilation of the contingent 
In-itself to which it is present, refuses the substantiality of 
being-in-itself. The For-itself thus exists as lack, as a 
desire of being, as a project toward acquiring ~ For-itself the 
density of In-itself. Sartre states: 
The for-itself projects being as for-itself, a being 
which is what it is. • •• It is as consciousness 
that it wishes to have the impermeability and in-
finite density of the in-itself. It is as the ni-· 
hilation of the in-itself and a perpetual evasion 
of contingency and of facticity that it wishes to 
be its own foundation. • •• The fundamental value 
which presides over this project is exactly the in-
itself-for-itself.~l 
Supported by, suspended between the contingent In-itself and the 
ideal In-itself-For-itself, consciousness exists then as a lack 
of the substantiality of the In-itself an4 hence as a desire of 
being, as a project to be In-itself-For-itself, to be God. The 
project of being is thus the fundamental project in terms of 
which man acts and defines himself. 
ll!m." 566. 
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Sartre avers, however, that man--as desire--relates not 
only to the In-itselt-For-itself, but also to concrete objects 
in the world. That man's relation to the contingent In-itself 
from the standpoint of doing and having is ult~ately reducible 
to his project of being constitutes, moreover, Sartre's thesis. 
Upon examination, then, the "cardinal categories of human real-
ity,,12 __ doing , having and being--are intended by Sartre to 
evince in still another way that the For-itself must and does 
exist as a lack of the substantiality of being-in-itself. 
Examining doing first, Sartre seeks to show that doing 
is reducible to having. The simple action ot taking a cigarette 
from a pack in order to have it appears to readily attest this 
Sartrean tenet. But Sartre wishes to fortify his case by con-
sidering a variety of human actions, actions which reveal, more-
over, not only the reduction of doing to having, but also the 
reduction of having to being. 
In creating his masterpiece, the artist, Sartre claims, 
aims at possessing something which bears the mark of himself and 
yet can be encountered in the world. The research scientist, 
too, seeks to appropriate the object known, the discovered truth 
in a way that makes it his own and leaves it public for others 
to know. Even in games and sports. Sartre maintains. the 
player aims at appropriating--in this case, victory; the skier 
12~. 431. 
attempts to master the snow and thereby make it his field of 
snow for others to witness. What do such activities reveal? 
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Certainly, the reduction of doing to having. But something more 
is manifested by the Sartrean interpretation of these actions. 
In each of the actions considered by Sartre, the appro-
priative character is marked simultaneously by the object's 
being a subjective emanation of the For-itself and by its re-
maining indifferent to the For-itselt, that is, by its remain-
ing In-itselt. This duality ot the appropriative character 
symbolizes the union ot possessor and possessed, the union ex-
pressed by the term "mine, n a term which signifies the middle 
ground between the utter interiority of the ~ and the utter 
exteriority of the non-me. But this middle ground, Sartre 
points out, is nothing other than an attempt to realize value, 
,the In-itselt-For-itself. Thus having, like doing, is not ir-
reducible; having is ultimately reducible to the project ot 
being. 1; 
While appropriation remains an element, then, in the 
various actions of man, what is sought is the realization of 
the In-itself-For-itselt, ot selt as selt-cause and as cause of 
one's world. In view of this project of being underlying man's 
appropriative etforts, Sartre views appropriation as expressive 
of a continuous creative bond between possessor and possessed. 
13 Cf. ~, 577-86. 
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The possessor is the raison d'etre of the possessed in that he 
I 
has the object ~_hi_m~se~l_f_and sustains it as being possessed. 
But, while the object, emanating trom the self, exists through 
the selt and appears as that selt, the union of self and not-
self remains ideal, since the very concept of creation--which 
establishes the bond of ownership14_-requires that the object 
be at once wholly the possessor and wholly independent of that 
possessor, an independence which thus precludes a real synthesis 
of self and not-self. Hence, the selt's desire to internalize 
~ contingent In-itself through appropriation remains unrealiz-
able. 
Emphasizing this unrealizable character of appropria-
tion, Bartre speaks of possession as tta magical relation; I ~ 
,these objects which I possess, but outside, so to speak, facing 
myself; I create them as independent of me; what I possess is 
mine outside of me, outside all subjectivity, as an in-itself 
which escapes me at each instant and whose creation at each 
instant I perpetuate.,,15 The goal of possession, the attempt of 
the possessor to enjoy his being-in-itself, to grasp himself as 
l4According to Bartre, creation occurs not only when the 
possessor makes the object possessed, but also when the possesse 
object is bought. For buying an object symbolizes creating the 
object; money appears as a creative force. Ct.![, 589-90. 
l5![, 591. 
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what he is in the possessed, is thus doomed to failure. As 
Bartre states: "'We see that appropriation is nothing save the 
sYmbol of the ideal of the for-itself or value. nl6 The dyad, 
For-itself possessing and In-itself possessed, is thus a sym-
bolic relation, a relation symbolizing the unrealizable project 
of the For-itself to become In-itself-For-itself. l ? But, how 
does appropriation reveal the For-itself qua relation? 
Focusing upon appropriation as an internal bond of 
being t Bartre claims that this bond demands the non-substanti-
ality of the For-itself. In oPPosition to substantialist phi-
losophies, he asserts: 
The possessed object exists in itself, is defined 
by permanence, non-temporality, a sufficiency- of 
being, in a word by substantiality. Therefore 
we must put unselbstandi~eit on the side of the 
possessing su~3ect. I sU:stance cannot appropriate 
another substance, and if we apprehend in things 
a certain quality of "being possessed," it is 
because originally the internal relation of the 
for-itself to the in-itself, which is ownership, 
derives its origin from the insufficiency of 
being in the for-itself.1B 
l~, 592. 
l7Because appropriation is only- symbolic, Bartre main-
tains, it does not afford satisfaction and thus the insatiabil-
ity of possession can give way to destruction of the possessed. 
Yet, he claims, destruction is akin to creation, inasmuch as it 
seeks to absorb the object in the self. Destruction, in fact, 
"realizes appropriation more keenly- than creation does, for the 
object destroyed is no longer there to show itself impene-
trable." (![, 593) 
IBBN 58B. 
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In other words, Sartre maintains that the fact of appropriation 
can be explained only on the grounds of a lack of being in the 
possessor, in the For-itself, since the permanence and self-
sufficiency of substance precludes any appropriative tendency. 
Thus there is appropriation only because the For-itself, in its 
being, is a refusal of the substantiality of being-in-itself, a 
refusal which it continually seeks to counter. 
That appropriation is "an internal bond of being,,,19 as 
rVidenced by various burial customs, by the importance attached 
to the property of a famous man, affords Sartre, moreover, 
another opportunity to laSh out against substantialist philos-
ophies. For, as an internal bond of being, appropriation cannot 
be construed as an external relation between two substances. 
Thus, Sartre avows, appropriation must be non-thetic. That it 
could be otherwise would require a radical, reflective scissi-
parity on the part of the For-itself--a scissiparity which is 
impossible for it a~ For-itself to achieve. Moreover, that 
appropriation occurs within the circuit of selfness attests its 
non-thetic mode of being. To possess, hence, "does not mean to 
know that one holds with the object possessed a relation iden-
tified as creation-destruction; rather to possess means to ~ 
!!!. this relation or better yet to be this relation.,,20 But, 
19~, 588. 
2o!!" 595. 
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how can the For-itself be a "s;ymbolic and ideal n2l relation? 
In the first place, that the symbolic relation of ap-
propriation is based upon the real relation which the For-itself 
is as a nihilation of In-itself appears to save the For-itself 
from collapse into utter ideality.22 In the second place. that 
the For-itself is altered in its very being by the appropriative 
relation evinces this relation as an internal bond of being. 
For, while this alteration does not result in the realization 
of the ideal In-itself-For-itself, the For-itself's appropria-
tion through action does result in a further determination of 
its essence. The appropriative relation, however, remains 
negative inasmuch as the For-itself must constitute itself as 
not that which it possesses. as E£! the SUbstantial In-itself, 
in order to possess. Hence, appropriation reveals the familiar 
structure of the For-itself: a relation of internal negation, 
a rela'tion which is the being of the For-itself as the contin-
ual nihilation of the substantiality of being-in-itself. 
2ll!!.. 592. 
22In a similar manner, the For-itself-Value dyad is 
founded on the For-itselfts nihilation of the contingent In-
itself and thereby upon its lack of being. For desirel as lack of being, has a single goal--to recover its missing be ng. 
Hence, Bartre claims, the desire to be and the desire to h.ave 
are in reality inseparable. The former seeks to confer being 
upon the For-itself directly, while the latter attempts to 
realize this goal through the mediation of the world in the 
circuit of saltness, attempts to appropriate this world across 
a particular In-itself. Cf.~, 597-98. 
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Being-for-others 
Though the For-itself's attempt to transfer itself to 
the possessed object in an effort to enjoy its being-in-itself, 
its being-outside, is doomed to failure, the For-itself can in-
directly grasp that it does have an outside in terms ot its 
being-tor-others. Claiming that "others are the Other, that is 
the selt which is E2i myself,p23 Bartre declares negation as 
constitutive of the being ot others and avers that the Hor-
itself's fundamental connection with the Other must be an in-
ternal negation which is a relation of being.24 But what is 
the nature of this relation which obtains between the For-itself 
and the Other? 
Wielding the tundamental intentionality of consciousness 
23BN, 230. 
-
24Situating his consideration of the Other in terms of 
the historical perspective of the problem of solipsism, Bartre 
finds the theme of negation as constitutive ot the structure of 
the being of others common to the various philosophic interpre-
tations. But he rejects modern philosophy's consideration of 
this negation as an external relation between two substances, a 
relation through knowledge. For, he comments, not only does 
the substantialist perspective preclude any relation with the 
Other as Other, as another consciousness, but its option of a 
cognitive relation also precludes a revelation of the Other as 
subject. While Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger surpassed the en-
deavor of the moderns by abandoning the postulate ot external 
negation, by refusing the substantialist view, they neverthe-
less failed to recognize, according to Sartre, that the For-
itself's relation to the Other cannot be primarily cognitive. 
To refute solipsism, the Other must be given as subject. Cf. 
1[, 223-52 for Sartre's historical account. 
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to elucidate the structure of being-for-others, as well as to 
repudiate the solipsistic stance, Sartre claims that the ex-
istence of the Other as subject can be secured when and only 
when I feel myself becoming an object for him, when I experience 
myself as being seen by him. But what does being seen mean for 
me? What is the significance of the Other's look? 
To illustrate this phenomenon, Sartre considers the 
situation of peeping through a keyhole. In such a situation, 
my positional consciousness is directed outside myself toward 
the scene behind the door. Suddenly, I hear footsteps; I am 
seen. I become ashamed. That I am ashamed is an effect of my 
being non-thetically aware of myself as existing for another. 
The Other makes me ~ for him, pulls me into his world as an 
object among objects, confers an In-itself upon me ~ his look. 
Establishing my transcendence as a given transcendence, the 
Other thus gives me a nature, a limit, an outside, which I am 
aware of non-thetically, but which I can never know, never see. 
As Sartre states: "All of a sudden I am conscious of myself as 
escaping myself, not in that I am the foundation of my own 
nothingness, but in that I have my foundation outside myself. 
I am for myself only as I am pure reference to the Other. n25 
But, while myself as object escapes me, while I never know my 
outside, I nevertheless accept it. For my shame at being 
25M, 260. 
caught is a confession that I !!!. this being-outside, that I 
enter into a relation with my being-far-others. Sartre ex-
presses this relation as follows: 
The appearance of the look is apprehended by me as an 
ekstatic relation at being, 01' which one term is the 
"me It as for-itself which is what it is not and is not 
what it is, and 01' which the other term is still the 
"men but outside my reach, outside my action, outside 
my knowledge. 26 
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~ the Other's look, then, the For-itselt relates to the tfme " 
which it ~, but out ot reach. Here, again, the For-itself is 
revealed as a being which precludes the type of cohesive iden-
tity 01' the In-itselt and yet identifies !a some way with this 
"me" which it is outside its reach. 
But in what sense is the For-itself's relation with the 
Other an internal bond of being? That my unreflective con-
sciousness apprehends myself insotar as I am an object tor the 
Other reveals that the Other's look has struck my very being. 
For, through the Other's look, a self comes to appear indirectly 
on the unreflective level--"the 'me' but outside my reach," the 
"me" of which I am ashamed. It is in terms of this moditication 
then, that Sartre considers the relation between the Other as 
subject and me as object an internal relation of being.27 
26mt, 268. 
-
27Sartre maintains, however, that ubeillfi-for-others is 
not an ontological structure of the For-itself. (BN, 282). 
For, in terms 01' the For-itselt's immediate structure, the self 
as object is prohibited on the unreflective level by the evan-
escence of the reflecting-reflection dyad. 
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The For-itself, however, can reverse this relation with 
the Other by looking at the "look" and making the Other obJect • 
. In order that the Other appear as object, the For-itself, more-
over, must constitute itself as not the Other, must include 
lithe being of the Other in its being insofar as its being is in 
question as not being the Other. n28 For Bartre, this internal 
negation, which constitutes "a unitary bond of being,,29 between 
the For-itself and the Other as object, is thus a reinforcement 
of the For-itself's selfness and an expression of the For-
itself's continual choice of its selfness. Hence, again, the 
For-itself, while denied the mode of identity and independence 
of the In-itself, reveals itself as a being having a mode of 
identity and a type of independence. 
In retrospect, being-for-others requires therefore two 
moments, two internal negations which preclude synthesis, since 
the Other as subJect and the Other as obJect cannot be united. 
If one experiences the Other, one fails to know him; if one 
knows the Other, one achieves only his being as object. 30 But, 
while the ~thesis of these two moments remains impossible, 
each moment reveals the Sartrean view of the For-itself as re-
lation. In the first moment, I non-thetically grasp myself as 
2~, 283. 
29BN 284. 
-' 
300f • ~, 302. 
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object for the Other who is an internal negation constituting 
himself as not-me and thereby giving rise to my self-as-object, 
the self with which I identify but not in the mode of being-in-
itself. In the second moment, however, since I remain trans-
cendence for myself, I can refuse myself as object and make the 
Other object :!!!. my look. In this moment, then, I am a rela-
tion of internal negation, choosing and reinforcing my selfness 
by rejecting that of the Other. Hence, while Sartre expresses 
the being of the For-itself as "the scattering of being-in-
itself, of a shattered totality, always elsewhere, always at a 
distance, never in itself, but always maintained in being by 
the perpetual explosion of this totality,"3l the For-itself 
continues to affirm itself as a being denied only the specified 
mode of identity of being-in-itself, rather than identity per !.!. 
Bo~y ~ For-itself. 32 
In opposition to the Cartesian dualism. Sartre claims: 
"Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly 
consciousness. "33 To clarity this claim, he takes as his 
31BN, 300. 
-
32Though Sartre considers three dimensions of the body 
(the body as For-itself, the body as known by the Other, the 
For-itself's non-the tic grasp of itself as a body known by the 
Other), our concern is limited to the body as For-itself, since 
the other dimensions are structured upon the previously ex-
amined relation of the For-itself to the Other. 
33m!. 305. 
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starting point the primary relation of the For-itself to the 
world--knowledge. Rejecting a pure knowledge, he declares that 
knowledge implies a specific point of view and obtains only as 
engaged. But this requires illustration. 
I look at this table and see not only the table, but 
also the ashtray to the left, the cup of coffee to the right. 
That I see these things in a certain order, that my point of 
view is limited to seeing a specific profile of this cup, that 
these instrumental things are oriented toward me as a center of 
reference demands that I appear in the midst of the world, that 
I be located, that I be bodied. As Bartre states: "The struc-
ture of the world demands that we cannot see without beipg 
visible.,,34 But, as my sense of sight seizes these objects in 
the world, rather than itself, so, too, with my body as the 
center of reference; it is th~t which I am, but it is never an 
object for me. It is my point of view upon which I cannot take 
a point of view. 
As the body of a consciousness engaged in the world, 
my body, moreover, must be inserted in the field of instru-
mentality as an instrument. Yet, Bartre maintains, the body 
is not to be construed as a physical instrument utilized by a 
soul, since such a utilization would admit an infinite regress 
and reduce instrumentality to nonsense. Thus, my body tor me 
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is an instrument which I~. My body is lived, neither util-
ized nor known. 
Yet, as the For-itself's point of view, as the For-
itself's center of reference with respect to a specific instru-
mental complex, the body is that beyond which the For-itself is 
as presence to the object, is that which the For-itself sur-
passes toward a new complex in its projection toward its pos-
sible. Expressing the implications of the body as surpassed, 
Sartre states: 
Thus the body, since it is surpassed, is the Past. 
It is the immediate presence to the For-itself of 
"sensible" things insofar as this presence indicates 
a center of reference and is already surpassed either 
toward the appearance of a new this or toward a new 
combination of in.str'WD.ental-things. In each project 
of -the F~r-itselt! in each perception the body is 
there; it is the 4mmediate Past insofar as it still 
touches on the Present which flees it. This means 
that it is at once a point of view and a ;point of 
departure--a point 'Of Vlev., a polntO?' !'epartllrewhich 
! am ana which at the same time I surpass toward what 
I have to be.35 
That the body as a point of view, as a point of departure, is 
perpetually surpassed reveals, moreover, that the "body is the 
contingent form which is taken up by the necessity of my con-
tingency.n36 What does this mean? 
Though the contingent form of the For-itself, the body 
is the necessary expression of the For-itselfts inability to 
3~, 326. 
36g" 328. 
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found its being. For, in virtue of this lack, the For-itself 
seeks to found itself by engaging in the world and thus re-
quires a body in order to be this point ot view--here. The 
body, therefore, is a manitestation of the For-itself's neces-
sary connection with In-itself, ot the For-itself's facticity. 
As that which the For-itself nihilates in its revolt against 
contingency, as the nihilated immediate past, the body, in 
other words, reters to the For-itselt's original necessary con-
nection with In-itselt--the nihilation ot that primary In-itself 
through which the For-itselt was metaphysically born. Assuming 
the For-itself's necessary contingency, then, the body is tfa 
permanent structure ot my being and the permanent condition of 
possibility ior my consciousness as consciousness of the world 
and as a transcendent project toward my future.,,37 What, how-
ever, is the relation of the I'or-itself to its body? 
Declaring that consciousness exists its body only as 
consciousness, Sartre contends that "the relation ot conscious-
ness to the body is an existential relation. n38 Not an object 
of knowledge for the For-itselt, the body belongs to "the 
structure of non-thetic self-consciousness. t.39 And yet, as the 
verb 
ness 
37m, 328. 
38mf, 329. The employment of "exist" as a transitive 
serves to emphasize that the primal relation of conscious-
to its body is a lived relation, not cognitive. 
39m!., 330. 
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nihilated immediate past, the body exists in the mode of In-
itself and thus cannot be simply identified with the non-thetic 
consciousness, with a free project toward its possibilities, 
toward its future. The body for the For-itself, then, appears 
to be simultaneously "nothing other than the for-itself tt40 and. 
tithe in-itself which is surpassed by the nihilating for-
itself. ,,41 This bedrock paradox expresses for Sartre two 
facets of body-for-itself: (1) as the For-itself's point of 
view and insertion into the world, the body is a necessary man-
ifestation of the For-itself's contingency and thus "nothing 
other than the for-itself," and (2) as the point of view on a 
specific complex of things, the body is the surpassed, the 
nihilated i~ediate past, a nihilated In-itself, in the For-
itself's projection toward the future and a new complex of 
things. With regard to this ~econd point, Sartrp. adds: "No-
where else shall we come closer to touching that nih11ation of 
the In-Itself by the For-itse1f. n42 And yet, though the body, 
as the For-itse1f's point of view, is perpetually surpassed, 
it is reborn in the very act of surpassing as a point of view 
on a new complexus of objects. There is, then, no ready-made 
formula for expressing the For-itse1f's relation to its body. 
40BN 
-' 
309. 
4lBN 
-' 
309. 
42BN 
-' 
333. 
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At most one can view this relation as an existential or non-
thetic relation through which the For-itself expresses an 
identity with its body as its point of view on the world, as 
its immediate past, and yet refuses the congealed, solidified 
identity of being-in-itself. 
The unfolding of the structure of the For-itself in 
terms of its relations to the world, as well as its self-
relations, discloses that Bartre employs the term "relation" 
to designate the For-itself as a being which is refused the 
substantiality, the mode of radical self-containment of the In-
itself. Perhaps, Bartre's most acute tour ~ force against 
the abstraction of a self-enclosed For-itself lies in his 
avowal of the dependence of the For-itself's self-relations 
upon its relations to the world. This Bartrean strategy is 
thus sufficiently significant to deserve brief consideration. 
Recall, presence to self--the primary self-relation 
through which the For-itself found its nothingness--requires, 
according to Bartre, the For-itself's presence to In-itself in 
the form of an existential relation of knOwledge.43 Only on 
the foundation of the For-itself relating to In-itself, then, 
is presence to self--the basic, immediate structure of the For-
itself--sustained. Moreover, because presence to self reveals 
43 Cf. above, 64. 
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the For-itself as lack and constitutes, in turn, the necessary 
condition for the upsurge of the lacked (value) and the lacking 
(the For-itself's possible), all of the immediate self-
relations of the For-itself refer ultimately to its metaphysical 
birth as the nihilation of a primary In-itself and its contin-
ual nihilation of the In-itself with which it engages in the 
world. Hence, not even in terms of its immediate self-
relations can the For-itself be considered a self-contained 
thing. 
For Bartre, then, the For-itself must be viewed as a 
lived relation suspended between the contingent In-itself which 
it perpetually nihilates and the In-itself-For-itself toward 
which it perpetually projects itself. Its being as temporality, 
moreover, reveals a similar structure, for the For-itself as 
present is a relation suspended between its past from which it 
flees44 and its future toward which it projects itself. Im-
plicit in this self-relation of temporality is, again, the For-
itself's nihilation of the In-itself and projection toward the 
In-itself-For-itself. 
In a striking repudiation ot the Cartesian, substantial 
cogito, Bartre claims that even the self-relation of reflection 
44Though the body as surpassed is past and thereby In-
itself, Bartre contends that the body is also a non-thetic 
structure of consciousness. But from this latter standpoint, 
the For-itself non-thetically grasps its body only through the 
indication of the instrumental things in the world. In this 
sense, a self-relation is again seen to be revealed in terms of 
an engagement in the world. 
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arises only in terms of the For-itself's engagement in the 
world. Because reflection consists in a dual effort to make 
the reflected-on an object and to appropriate it, the reflec-
tive consciousness seeks to view the reflected-on from the out-
side, to see itself as the Other sees it. But this attempt 
presupposes that the For-itself has been seen and has non-
thetically grasped itself as having an outside. Moreover, the 
goal of appropriation implicit in the reflective effort has as 
its primary analogate the For-itself's appropriative relations 
to the In-itself. Hence, reflection, though a self-relation, 
is dependent upon the For-itself's relation to the Other and to 
the world. 
That the For-itself's self-relations imply its engage-
ment in and across the world evinces unequivocally tor Sartre 
that any treatment of the For-itself as a self-enclosed thing, 
existing in the same manner as the In-itself, is a hopeless 
abstraction. As previously stated, to convey that the For-
itself is refused the In-itself's mode of self-containment, of 
substantiality, Sartre desigIl!ltes the For-itself "relation." 
Included in the Sartrean polemic against the substantialists 
are, moreover, significant ontological implications. The For-
itself has repeatedly been characterized as a relation of in-
ternal negation, as a relation of identity denied. The re-
lation which is being-for-itself, furthermore, has been found 
to be a dynamic activity in terms of which the For-itself 
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determines and defines its essence. That the term to which the 
For-itself relates remains static reveals, moreover, that the 
For-itself is a univocal relation.45 But what are the ontolog-
ical implications of a relation characterized by internality, 
negativity and univocity? 
The demands upon a relation which is internal are 
usually twofold: (1) each term must affect the other in its 
being and (2) each term must thereby be included in the being 
of the other. Because Sartre considers the For-itself a univ-
ocal relation, however, the term which the For-itself includes 
in its being, the term which affects the For-itself in its 
being, need not itself include or be affected in its being by 
the For-itself. Take, for example, a man who has a general 
grasp of the contemporary, world situation. That situation 
nei ther includes this man in its being nor is affected directly 
by the fact that the man knows it. The internality of this re-
lation is thus only one-sided, on the side of the For-itself. 
But the character of this internality must be further explored. 
That this man adopts certain attitudes toward life, 
toward his fellow man, toward himself evinces that what is known 
has affected him at the heart of his being, that what is known 
450f • 1m, 284, 308. The notable exception to this uni-
vocity is the relation of being-tor-others. But in an effort 
to find a general meaning of the For-itself as relation, one 
can only note exceptions. 
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is included in his being. For the only way to explain such phe-
nomena is to say that he II what he knows, that he exists the 
contemporary situation, that he non-thetically lives what he 
knows. But yet, while he II what he knows, he does not collapse 
into baing simply what he knows, since this would involve his 
slipping into In-itself and ceasing to be For-itself. The For-
itself, then, while including what is known in its being and 
while being affected intrinSically by what is known, neverthe-
less constitutes itself as E£l being simply what is known. 
The For-i tsel!, in other words, !!. what it knows, but not in 
the solidified mode of being-in-itself. For the For-itself 
includes in its being the term to which it relates in the only 
mode ontologically open to it--in the mode of non-being, in the 
mode of flight, in the mode of For-itself. As Sartre states of 
the For-itself's futile attempt to gain the self-coincidence 
and self-containment of the In-itself: "I want to grasp this 
being and I no longer find anything but m.yse'.! ... 46 But this is 
the fate of the For-itself in its relations to the world, as 
well as its self-relations.47 For the For-itself is a being 
which is intrinsically affected by a term that is included in 
its being, but not in the concrete mode o! identity of being-
in-itself. Whether the term be the self to which it is present, 
46g:, 218. 
470f• the summary ot Chapter I of Part Two tor a review 
ot the For-itself's failure to achieve the selt-coincidence ot 
the In-itself even in its selt-relations. 
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the In--itself-For-itself, its horizon of possibles, its past, 
its future, the consciousness reflected-on, its body, the con-
crete In-itself which it knows and appropriates or the Other, 
the For-itsel! relates to it in a bond of being, a bond in 
terms o! which it is intrinsically altered, a bond in terms of 
which it constitutes itself as this For-itself by its non-thetic 
grasp that it is a2i any of these terms in the mode of In-
itself. Ahead of itself, behind itself, outside itself: the 
For-itself finds itself only as flight, as lack, as a being de-
pendent in its being upon the region of In-itself, as a being 
dependent in its process of self-construction upon the various 
terms cited, as a being whose being is diasporatic, as a being 
refused the solidification, identity, self-containment and 
fullness of being-in-itself. 
For Sartre, that the For-itself is what it is not and 
is not what it is conveys its meaning as a relation of internal 
negation, as a relation of identity denied. That the For-
itself be conceived in this way stems ultimately from the Bar-
trean perspective of its metaphysical birth as the nihilation 
of an In-itself. But there are certain options that Bartre 
made with regard to this metaphysical phenomenon. That the 
For-itself be an internal relation was his option when con-
fronted with the alternative of a self-contained substance 
entering into only external relations and existing in the mode 
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ot the Bartrean In-itself. This primal rejection of such a 
substantialist view of the For-itself constitutes the foundatio 
for Bartre's refusal to attribute to the For-itself the sub-
stantial characteristics of the In-itself. But, while refusing 
the For-itself the same mode of substantiality as the In-itself, 
has Bartre actually refused it ~mode of substantiality? 
From the examination of the For-itselt's self-relations 
in the preceding chapter, it can be ascertained that the For-
itself sustains its relationality within the unity of its being 
and possesses ~mode of identity with the terms to which it 
relates in virtue of the very character ot self-relations. That 
Bartre repeatedly asserts that the For-itself ~ each of the 
terms to which it relates, but not in the mode of In-itself, 
turther suggests that the For-itself has ~ type of identity. 
Moreover, the Sartrean avowal that the For-itself, in making the 
Other be as object for it, reinforces its seltness and expresses 
a continual choice of its selfness indicates again that the For-
itself grasps a mode of identity with itself and evinces, in 
addition, that the For-itself has ~mode of independence. 
Furthering this view of the For-itself existing in a mode of 
independence is the Bartrean option to consider the For-itself 
an internal relation of negation. For it is solely in terms of 
constituting itself as ~ simply that to which it relates that 
the For-itself constitutes itself as a this. Then, too, it is 
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in terms of its nihilating activity that the For-itself can 
never simply be the In-itself that it knows and seeks to appro-
priate. Since the For-itself, therefore, does not lapse into 
the being of the In-itself which it knows and seeks to appro-
priate, it appears to have a certain mode of independence from 
the In-itself. Finally, Bartre's declaration that the For-
itself is freedom suggests a mode of independence accruing to 
the being of the For-itself. Hence, once again, the question 
arises as to whether Sartre has substantialized the "relation" 
which is For-itself.48 
~cause this final paragraph was intended to s~gest, 
on the basis of the considerations of Part Two, that Sar~ 
might be attributing to the For-itself characteristics analo-
,OUt to the substantial In-itself, no documentation was offered. 
o reat 5,1stematically this question concerning the substan-
tialization of the For-itself and to provide the necessary 
documentation is the task of Part Three. 
PART THREE 
THE FOR-ITSELF: SUBSTANTIAL OR NON-SUBSTANTIAL? 
CHAP.I!ER I 
IS THE FOR-ITSELF SUBSTANTIALIZED? 
As disclosed by the examination of the structure of the 
For-itself, the Sartraan declaration that the For-itself is 
relation has as its principal target the substant1alist equation 
of human reality with a salt-contained thing. In rejecting 
this equation, Sartre claims transcendence as the chief char-
acteristic of human reality and denounces the substantialist 
illusion as a hopeless abstraction. He holds that the sub-
stantialist denial of the internal relationality of the being 
of man constitutes a failure to consider the fact of man's 
dependence on being-in-itself for the data with which he works 
in the process of self-construction, as well as for the very 
foundation of his being. He contends that the substantialist 
identification of human reality with what it is at any given 
instant neglects to take into account the dynamism of man as a 
being which is teD'.!porality, as a being which forges its own 
essence, as a being which is perpetually ahead of this self-
constructed essence in pursuit ot further possibles, in pursuit 
of the In-itself-For-itself. Ultimately, the Sartrean polemic 
against the substantialists rests with his view that both the 
project of man--to be a consciousness which has the 
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substantiality of the In-itself--and the actions in terms of 
which man seeks to realize this project are explicable only if 
man is considered as a lack of the substantiality of the In-
itself or, in Sartrean terms, non-substantial. 
Yet, it was observed in the closing paragraph of the 
preceding section that Sartre, while maintaining the For-
itself's lack of the mode of substantiality of being-in-itself, 
nevertheless appears to provide the For-itself with a type of 
unity, identity, "thisness" and independence--in short, with a 
type of substantiality. A question thus arises as to whether 
Sartre has substantialized the For-itself in a mode analogous 
to that of the In-itself. The philosophical import of this 
question lies not only in its immediate metaphysical ramifi-
cations, but also in its bearing upon the Sartrean utilization 
of the For-itself as the source of traditional categories of 
being. For, with regard to this latter point, the establish-
ment of a Sartrean employment of an analogous notion of sub-
stance would mitigate his declaration of a radical distinction 
between the two rf;gions of being and would thus make plausible 
his wielding of the For-itself to issue categories of being. 
In an effort to resolve the question concerning whether the 
For-itself can bear the ontological burden of issuing the cate-
gories of being. it hence bec.,)mes necessary to azcel'tain first 
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whether Sartre has substantialized the For-itself. 
In handling this question of a possible Sartrean sub-
stantialization of the For-itself, it would be advantageous to 
consider initially a selective, historical sketch of the notion 
of substance, for SllCh an approach would provide a review of 
traditional characteristics assigned to substance and would 
afford a sharper focus upon Sartrets own historical context for 
his polemic against substantialist philosophies. It is neces-
sary, moreover, to re-examine the Sartrean consideration of the 
For-itself to see whether Sartre actually stocks the For-itself 
with characteristics analogous to those substantial character-
istics ascribed to the In-itself and/or recorded in the history 
of philosop~. Such are the concerns of this present chapter. 
The following chapter will further pursue this issue of the 
substantialization of the For-itself, but from the standpoint 
of a consideration of the ontological status of the For-itself 
as it is operat1've in the Sartrean account of the issuance of 
the categories of being. The attempt to settle the question of 
substantializat10n and the ultimate question concerning whether 
the For-itself can bear the ontological burden of originating 
the categories of being will be delayed, however, to Part Four. 
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! Historical Sketch 2!~ Notion of Substancel 
Pervading the treatment of substance throughout the 
history of philosophy is an ambiguity regarding the meaning of 
the term "substancen--an ambiguity originating with Aristotle. 
For Aristotle used this term to designate not only the indi-
vicl1.1al thing, l)ut a.lso the essential nature common to many 
things. 2 This duality of signification, however, need not con-
cern us directly, since our interest lies principally with the 
characterization of substance as the individual thing. 
Regarding substance as the individual thing, Aristotle 
claimed that substance can be said to exist apart or have an 
independence in mode of being only if considered as the whole 
thing inclusive of qualities. Since the qualities "are not 
somet'h:tTlJ!: outside it which it needs in addition to itself',"3 
the Aristotelian substance is thus self-contained. Or, as ex-
pressed in other words: "The individual alone is that which 
belongs to itself only, which is not borne up by some other, 
lIn this presentation of select notions of substance 
voiced in the his~.;ory ot philosophy, secondary sources are being 
employed in order to allow one freedom from involvement in the 
problematic of substance as it grips the various systems. In 
cases where Sartre himself bas put forth interpretations of his-
torical notions of substance, the Sartrean interpretation will 
be employed. Our chief interest in this section lies only in 
a listing of characteristics ascribed to substance. 
2 Cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co., 
Ltd., 1956), 165. 
3Ibid• 
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which is what it is by reason of itself, and not upon the basis 
of some other being. n4 This mode of independence in being, 
moreover, attests that "individual substances cannot be rela-
tive.,,5 Chief among the characteristics of Aristotelian sub-
stance, then, are "thisness," independence, non-relationality 
in mode of being and determination--both in the sense of a 
"whatness" and singularity.6 The Aristotelian "this here thing: 
however, is always more than what it is essentially, is always 
more than a "such ... 7 Furthering this notion and the Aristo-
telian repudiation of change as ~ bare succession, it has 
further been suggested that the ability to admit contrary qual-
ifications be affirmed as a chief characteristic of Aristotelian 
4B• Costelloe and J. Muirhead Aristotle and the Earlier Peri~atetics, I (New York: Russell & RUssell, Inc.,~62). 331- 2. ThIs statement expresses well the type of view of sub-
stance which Sartre refuse s the For-i tse1t • In this regard. it 
is interesting to comiare it with Sartrean statements concern-
ing the For-itself: Consciousness is born sUiPorted by a 
being which is not itself." (RN,! lxi) Again,consciousness is 
a being such that in its beibf-;-l.ts b_~~ 1~ in mstion In so 
Yar as thIs beiI! apnes a eing otlieF'thiii I'tse ." Qltr,-
Iiiir- Ahd, sti again, "ine tOr-itself Without the in-itself 
is a kind ot abstraction; it could not exist ~ more than a 
color could exist without form ••• " (![. 621) 
5Ibid., 287. Cf. also 289. 
6Cf• J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 
Meta,bysics (Toronto: PontIfical In'St"itute ol"'11itrreva1 StUdies, 
1957 ~91, tor a further listing ot characteristics of Aris-
totelian substance. 
7CI• J. H. Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York: Columbia 
University Press. 1960), 11;-18. 
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substance.8 Hence, independence, individuality, determination, 
non-relationality in mode of being and ability to admit con-
trary qualities emerge as the primary characteristics of sub-
stance as viewed by Aristotle. 
These characteristics ascribed to substance by Aris-
totle are affirmed also by St. Thomas Aquinas, though there is 
a difference in perspective in the latter's discussion in terms 
of his inSight into "esse." Whether "substance" be used to 
designate a metap~sical principle of being or an individual 
thing, Aquinas demands its being considered in relation to 
"esse." Substance, as a metap~sical principle, he defines as 
the essence of a thing as directly related to "esse," and thus 
as the principle by which the being is determinate. As a meta-
physical principle distinct from accidents, substance, more-
over, is the potential principle by which the being admits of 
contrary quali£ications within the determinate limits of its 
essence. Hence, determinateness and the capability to admit 
contrary qualifications accrue to the individual thing in 
virtue of the metaphysical principle of substance. 
This being--the individual thing--Aquinas also terms 
"substance." "Substance is the thing in its necessary role of 
independent existence."9 Because finite substances, however, 
SOf. Ross, Aristotle, 24, 166. 
9R• E. McOall, The Reality of Substance, A Dissertation 
--Philosophical Studies:--ko. 1GB (gashlngton: The Oatholic 
University of America Press, 1956), 50. 
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are caused beings, "the independent existence proper to sub-
stance means independence not as to cause but as to mode. nlO 
Independence as to mode of existenoe thus ranks with determin-
ateness and the oapability to admit contrary qualifications in 
characterizing substanoe. Moreover, in view of the Thomistio 
notion of signate matter, individuation, too, comes to rest 
upon substance. Then, too, because Aquinas views being as con-
vertible with the transcendental one, substance--as the whole 
thing--must be actually undivided in itself. 
In addition to these characteristics of Thomistic sub-
stance, one more should be ci ted--identi ty. According to 
Thomistic philosophy, substance constitutes: 
• • • the concrete expression of the principle of 
identi ty. Wi thout substanoe there is no lim1 t 
placed on the number of predications, because there 
is never aQ1thing at which a final point must be 
reached for the two mutually exclusive alternates: 
being so or not so. • •• The eternal dichotomy 
of something or nothing pushes its roots into sub-
stance.ll 
This consideration of identity is intrinsically bound to the 
Thomistic account of accidental change, since substance--as a 
metaphysical principle--is viewed as the enduring substrate, as 
10 Ibid., 148. 
llIbid., 54. This statement expresses well the type of 
substantiallst view which Sartre refuses the For-itself. For 
the view of substance as the determinant regarding whether a 
thing is so or not so, is incompatible with the being of the 
For-itself, since the For-itself, as transcendence, reaches a 
final point only when it ceases to be transcendence, only in 
death. 
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the permanent, throughout such a change.12 But so much for the 
Thomistic doctrine of sUbstance. 
The historical setting for Bartre's own polemic with 
substantialist ph1losopr~e~ is provided by the period of modern 
philosophy and, within that period, by Descartes in particular. 
Refusing a univocal predication of substance to God and created 
things, Descartes distinguished between absolute substance, 
that which exists in and of itself. God, and relative substance, 
that which is cau.sed in existence, mind and body. 13 Wi th 
respect to mind and body, however, he em.ployed a univocal con-
cept of substance. Relative substance, whether m1nd or body, 
he averred, can be termed such to the extent that it is the 
support of the qualities which inhere in it. Moreover, as sup-
port, relative substance is the unChanged throughout Change.14 
120f• G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., Introduction to the Phi-
lOSOjhY ~ ~ (2nd ed., New York: IppIeton-Cintliry-Cro:r=es;-
196:r~9~or a further account of substance, cf. 243-51. 
It may be said, by wq of suggestion, that this view of sub-
stance as the enduring sub~ect ot accidental change tends to 
mitigate the Thomistic view of substance as a ~tential prin-
ciple which, when actualized by accidents, is ~ principle by 
which the being exists according to a new, accidental modifi-
cation. This point will be further developed, however, in a 
later context. 
l3Th1s view ot a non-univocal predication of "substance" 
to God and created things is posited also by Aquinas. It is in 
terms of this distinction that the independence of created 
things is restricted to mode of existence. 
l~he consideration of substance as the unchanged was 
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But, in addition to being characterized as an unchanged sub·--
strate, relative substance, as revealed by the Cartesian 
possession of clear and distinct ideas, exists independently of 
other such substances. Each is simply what it is in total self-
containment.15 Thus the Cartesian relativ0 substance emerges as 
an insular, permanent "what-it-is. tt It is precisely this type 
of substantiality which Sartre denies the For-itself. 
Bartre's comments in repudiation of the substantiality 
of the Cartesian cosito further a sharpening of focus on his 
issue with substantialists. He states: tiThe ontological error 
of Cal'tesian rationalism is not to have seen that if the ab-
solute is defined by the primacy of existence over essence, it 
can not be conceived as a substance. Consciousness has nothing 
substantial."IG In terms of this statement, Sartre rejects the 
Cartesian claim to have made the cosito an object of knowledge, 
for such a claim, according to Sartre, entails the petrifica-
tion of the cogito into a "what-it-is.1I Sartre contends, more-
over, that the Cartesian cosito fails to express the dynamism of 
prevalent in the classical period of modern philosophy. Locke, 
for example, also treated substance as the bare, faceless, in-
ert support of qualities. Then, too, for Kant, substance was 
equated with the noumenon "behind It the phenomenon, with the un-
changed "behind" the changing. 
l5For a discussion ot the Cartesian doctrine ot sub-
stance, cf. J. D. Collins, A Historr ot Modern European Phi-
losoppy (Milwaukee: Bruce,J.<)61), 7;=83. 
1 Gmt , lvi. 
-
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the being of consciousness. "It preserves the character of 
being-in-itself in its integrity, although the for-itself is 
its attribute. This is what is called Descartes' substantialist 
illusion. Hl? This is the illusion which the Sartrean consider-
ation has sought to repudiate. As Sartre states: "This being, 
under our observation, has been transcended toward value and 
possibilities; we have not been able to keep it within the sub-
stantial limits of the instantaneity of the Cartesian cogito ... 18 
In virtue of the dynamic temporality of the For-itself, more-
over, "the Cartesian cogito ought to be formulated rather: II 
think; therefore I was. ,"19 For the Cartesian, reflective 
cogito, according to Sartre, cannot be in a congealed mode ot 
identity with the consciousness-retlected-on; it must be ahead 
ot the retlected-on, thereby placing the latter in the immediate 
past. 20 Thus, trom Sartre's perspective, the being ot the For-
itself continues to refuse the Cartesian predication of sub-
stantiality, continues to refuse the Cartesian abstraction of 
l?m, 84. 
l~, 104. Ct. also 84-85 131-35, 156 tor Sartre's 
turther comments on the instantaneIty of the Cartesian cor-to. 
It should be noted, moreover, that the Sartrean cogito di fers 
from the Cartesian cogito as the non-thetic consciousness con-
ditioning the latter. cl. Part One, 10-11. 
19BN', 119. 
-
20Cf• Part Two, Chapter I, 48-53 for the foundation of 
this Sartrean criticism of the Cartesian cosito. 
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instantaneity. Moreover, in view of the Bartrean consideration 
of the relationality of the For-itself, the For-itself emerges 
as a being which is denied the Cartesian cogito's self-
containment and radical independence from the world. As Bartre 
states: "There is not a for-itself on the one hand and a world 
on the other as two closed entities for which we must subse-
quently seek some explanation as to how they communicate. The 
for-itself is a relation to the world. n2l From this abbreviated 
sketch of the Bartrean critique ot the Cartesian cogito, then, 
it can be attested that Bartre's re~ection ot substantiality 
for the For-itselt has as its target the type ot substantiality 
ot Descartes' cogito--a selt-contained, permanent "what-it-is." 
It is thus the Cartesian notion ot substance which Bartre re-
jects when he avows the non-substantiality of the For-itself. 
It is, moreover, in terms ot the Bartrean adoption of the Car-
tesian notion ot substance in his characterization ot the In-
itselt that Bartre views the For-itself as lacking the sub-
stantiality ot the In-itselt. But what, specitically, are the 
substantial characteristics which Bartre himselt attributes to 
being-in-itselt, to the region of substance? 
In virtue of his regional view of substance t Bartre 
claims that only the In-itself "exists in itself, is defined by 
permanence, non-temporality, a sufficiency of being, in a word 
2l!!,., 306. 
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by substantiality."22 That being-in-itself exists in itself 
is, moreover, an affirmation of its independence, the pri-
mary characteristic o! substance for Bartre, as well as for 
Aristotle, Aquinas and Deae~·~es. As Bartre states: "It is 
this independence which constitutes in the in-itself its 
character as a thing.n 23 The independence of the In-itsel!, 
however, refers not to that o! a causa ~,24 but rather to 
the mode of being o! the In-itself. For, as "fully !ormed,"25 
the In-itsel! is what it is and thus requires no relation to 
other things.26 It is the principle o! identity, moreover, 
which expresses this self-containment and permanent determi-
nateness o! the In-itsel!. A regional prinCiple o! being, 
aooording to Bartre, the prinoiple of identity designates "the 
opaoity o~ being-in-itself,n27 "the negation of every 
speoies o.! relation at the heart of being-in-itself.,,28 In 
terms of this solidified mode of identity, in terms of its 
22!!,. 588. 
23!!" 506. 
240f• EN, lxiv, 620. It is Bartre's contention that 
the In-itsel! wourcf have to be consciousness in order to found 
itselt and thus that the In-itself oannot be a causa sui. 
Though he repudiates any theory ot divine creation as-explana-
tory of the In-itselt, he presoinds from making a definitive 
statement as to the foundation ot this region of being. 
2~, 174. 
260!. mi. lxvi. 
27 •• lxvi. 
2ami 
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bedrock permanence, being-in-itself, furthermore, is beyond 
change and thus beyond temporality. Hence, independence, de-
terminateness, identity, permanence, non-relationality and non-
temporality emerge as the characteristics of the realm of In-
itself, the realm. of Sartrean substance.29 
In terms of this historical consideration of select 
notions of substance, it can be ascertained that the following 
characteristics are commonly ascribed to sUbstance: indepen-
dence as to mode or being, identity, unity, determinateness, 
permanence and non-relationality. In addition to such common 
denOminators, the potentiality to admit contrary accidents 
should also be cited as a distinctive feature of the Aristo-
telian-Thomistic doctrines of substance. 30 These characteris-
tics, however, suggest only guidelines for approaching the 
29With respect to non-relationality substantialist phi-
losophies, in general, admit external relatIons as compatible 
with substance, though they reject internal relations. Sartra, 
however. in line with his general thesis that the For-itselt 
issues all categories of being, claims that the In-itself can 
enter into external relations only on the grounds of a For-
itself's presence to it. ct. Bit ??, 362. Nevertheless, the 
important point with regard to non-relationality is the denial 
ot internal relatioDs for ~~ substance and on this point Sartre 
concurs with traditional substantialist philosophies. 
30It is interesting to note that this admission or such 
a potentiality for substance does not deter Aristotle and 
Aquinas from using substance as the focal point ot a thing's 
independence, un1 ty, identity and permanence. For it appears 
paradoxical that those who consider substance as a potential 
for turther actualization and those who consider it as the bed-
rock unchanged nevertheless are agreed on the function of sub-
stance with respect to these other characteristics. But this 
point will be reconsidered in Part Four. 
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question concerning whether the Sartrean For-itself is sub-
stantialized in a manner analogous to the In-itself. To pro-
ceed more directly on the road to a resolution of this issue, 
it is necessary to re-examine the Sartrean For-itself from the 
standpoint of such guidelines. 
Characteristics of the For-itself: 
substantIal? - -
Substantial- or Non-
------........................ -- ................ 
. 
In reconsidering the Sartrean For-itself in terms of 
the question of substantialization, it should be noted at the 
outset that Sartre himself does not claim to have wielded an 
analogous notion ot substance. This faot, together with his 
repeated repudiation of the substantialist illusion, suggests 
that, if the substantialization of the For-itself be ultimately 
affirmed, the affirmation will go beyond any deolaration within 
the Sartrean system. Moreover, in terms of Sartre's refusal 
to use substance--a "what-it-is"--as a "caricature"3l for the 
independence, un! ty, identi ty and permanence of human reality, 
an affirmation of a Sartrean, substantialized For-itself would 
imply a suggestion of different ways in which a substance can be 
said to have independence, unity, identity and permanence and 
would thus have significant metaphysical ramifications for a 
general doctrine of substance, as well as for an explicit 
working out of the analogy of substance. 32 But let us re-
examine the For-itself. 
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The review of historical doctrines of substance has 
revealed independence as the principal characteristic of sub-
stance and has thus provided us with a starting point in our 
inquiry concerning the substantialization of the For-itself. 
Such Sartrean assertions as "the for-itself is in no way an 
autonomous substance,·33 "the for-itself without the in-itself 
is a kind ot abstractionu34 would appear, however, to eradicate 
any hope of attributing independence to the For-itself. 
Sartre's account of the metaphysical birth of the For-itself as 
a nibilation ot a particular In-itself. together with his on-
tological proof, moreover, would appear to efface independence 
from the being of the For-itself. 35 And yet, while the For-
itself is intrinsically bound to the In-itself, it nevertheless 
constitutes itself as B2l in the mode of being-in-itself that 
In-itself to which it is present. Thus the Sartrean For-itself 
manifests itself as not the things to which it is present, 
......... 
32In addition to these general metaphysical implications 
stemming from the issue of substantialization, there is, more-
over, the point with which we are particularly concerned, namely 
whether a substantialization of the For-itself would make more 
plausible the Sartrean employment of the For-itself to issue the 
categories of being. 
33BN, 618 • 
....... 
~, 621. 
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as independent from these things, but this independence is re-
vealed only on the ground of its fundamental dependence. This, 
however, requires further consideration. 
The Sartrean account of the For-itself's relations to 
the world revealed a common theme bearing significantly upon the 
question of the For-itself's independence. For Bartre averred 
that every relation which the For-itself sustains with the In-
itself and the Other in its effort to be In-itself-For-itself 
flings the For-itself back upon j.tself as this For-itself, as 
always other than the beings to which it relates. As Bartre 
states: "I want to grasp this being and I no longer find any-
thing but !lself. n36 That I do not collapse into the being of 
what I know, into the being of what I act upon, into the being 
of what I possess thus attests a real independence in being on 
my part. Then, too, since I never attain the unitary synthesis 
of myself and In-itself which is the In-itself-For-itself, my 
independence from the In-itself is further evinced. Bartre 
himself, in speaking of the For-itself's failure to realize the 
ideal synthesis of In-itselt-For-itself, asserts: "It is this 
perpetual failure which explains both the indissolubility of the 
in-itself and of the for-itself and at the same time their rel-
ative independence. H3? The For-itself is thus considered by 
3~, 218. 
3?mr, 623. 
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Sartre to have an independence in being. But my independence as 
For-itself is such that it does not eradicate my real dependence 
on the In-itself and Others in my task of self-construction; my 
independence, in other words, is such that it does not deny that 
my relations to the world are demanded by my being as a con-
sciousness of something other than itself. Hence, the inde-
pendence of the Sartrean For-itself--its being other than others 
to which it relates--is an independence which asserts itself 
across the field of the For-itself's fundamental dependence 
upon the world. 
The Sartrean claim that the For-itself is freedom, 
moreover, develops this same theme--an independence in the face 
of dependence. For, in virtue ot the For-itselt's relation to 
In-itself, freedom exists only in situation. Freedom, as the 
For-itself's independence, then, emerges in the context of the 
For-itself's dependence on In-itself. But, in what way does 
my freedom assert my independence from the particular things to 
which I relate in my concrete situation? 
While I always exist in a concrete situation, while I 
always exist in relation to the things within that situation, 
my treedom is the source of my making these things exist for 
me. It is my freedom which allows me to crystallize an end 
aeross a given and to provide a new meaning for that given in 
the light of my end. For example, in walking along the shore, 
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I detect sea-shells and choose to collect some and use them for 
decorative purposes in my home. By removing them from.their 
natural locale, by incorporating these things into my concrete 
project, I assert my independence from them by making them exist 
for me. It is my freedom which is my possibility of detachment 
from things as they are, which is my choice of a concrete change 
to be bestowed on a concrete given, which is my assertion of in-
dependence in the face of dependence. 
In virtue of m::i. fr'aecionl, "Ilf3' concrete proJects, moreover, 
are always open, always contain the possibility of further mod-
ifications. If I am driving down a road en route to an appoint-
ment and suddenly discover that the road ahead is strewn with 
fallen branches, through my initiative I can act upon these 
givens which offer resistance to the realization of my end. I 
can cast them aside and proceed on my way. My freedom thus re-
veals itselt as a spontaneity "beyond reach" ot things in my 
situation and thus as independent ot the se things. Hence, as 
a spontaneity "beyond reach" and yet ",!! having !2. ~ with some-
thing other than itself,,,38 freedom affirms that the For-itself 
is independent in the sense of being other than others and in 
the sense of dominating other things.39 
In terms of this discussion, then, it can be said that 
3~, 506-507. 
39This discussion of freedom is based upon the Sartrean 
account presented in ![, 433-556. 
112 
Sartre does provide the For-itself with an independence in 
being. As he states of the For-itself: I1It 'is' in the mode 
of For-itself; that is, as a separated existent inasmuch as it 
reveals itself as not being being, ,,40 that is, as not being 
being-in-itself. He defines a free existent, moreover, as "an 
existent which as consciousness is necessarily separated from 
all others because they are in connection with it only to the 
extent that they are I!l:E.. ll. ,,41 This independence which Sartre 
ass:!.gns to human reality, however, does not involve a se11-
sufficiency in being, is not the same as the independence of a 
stone. F0r to exist as For-itself, as a consciousness of some-
thing other than itself, demands internal relations to the 
world. Yet, Sartre maintains that the For-itself's dependence, 
expressed in terms of its internal relations to the world, does 
not deny its real independence, since the very positing ot in-
ternal relations involves the "positing of an othernessH42 and 
thus involves the For-itself's non-thetic grasp ot itselt as 
other than this otherness, that is, as independent. 
The independence ot the For-itself, moreover, in se-
curing the For-itself's dividedness from others, secures a 
dimension ot what is traditionally termed "unity." For the 2.B!. 
~, 123. 
4l!!" 453. 
42§!, 77. 
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is defined as that which is actually undivided in itself and 
divided trom others. But, while independence manifests the 
For-itselt's dividedness from others, in what sense can the 
actual undividedness of the For-itself be affirmed? That Sartre 
does affirm the For-itseltts unity can be evinced by turning to 
virtually a~ page ot B~~ Nothingness. The question. 
however, remains: in what sense can a being which is what it 
is not and is not what it is be considered as actually undivided 
in 3elf7 
A reconsideration o! the self-relations of the Por-
itself reveals that, although the For-itself has distinct 
I1di:ruensions." it nevertheless admits of an interpenetration of 
its dimensions. Recall, the reflecting-reflection dyad. the 
For-itsel!-value dyad. the For-itselt-possible relation and the 
reflective-reflected-on relation each man1feste~ a distinction 
of terms. but wi thin the bounds of a fundamental interpenetra-
tion. For in each relation neither term could achieve actual 
independence from the other. 43 But. if there is no actual 
43Por a discussion ot each of these self-relations. cf. 
Part Two, Chapter I. It should be noted that Sartre formulates 
these selt-relations in terms of the Por-itselt's retusal ot 
the same mode of identitz as that o! the In-itself. To the ex-
tent that identity Is oneness with selt, these selt-relations, 
however, can be considered from the standpoint of an analofous 
predication of un1~ Moreover, it the Sartrean For-Itsei Is 
discovered to be ac lly undivided in itself,in a mode analo-
gous to the unity of the In-itself. this would be suggestive of 
its identity--the ·'1 am I.tt The question-of the For-itself's 
identity. however, must be considered separately. 
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independence of the terms which the For-itself sustains in its 
self-relations, then the For-itself must be a being which is 
actually undivided or one. 
The Sartrean view of the For-itself as nthe being which 
has to be its being in the diasporatic form of Temporality,n44 
however, poses a problem with respect to the question of the 
For-itself's unity, since Sartre considers the past as In-
itself, as substance.45 Yet, the Sartrean account of tempor-
ality affirms the unity of the For-itself inasmuch as the For-
itself as present is conditioned by its past and its future as 
much as it conditions them. 46 Hence, again, Sartre maintains a 
type of interpenetration as coming to bind the For-itse1f's 
distinct dimensions: "None of them can exist without the other 
two. n47 If, then, none can achieve actual independence, can 
exist actually divided from the other two, the For-itself--as 
temporality--must be a being which is actually undivided in 
itself. 
"m, 142. 
450f• !N, 115, 119. Sartre's ontological characteriza-
tion of the past as In-itself poses a bedrock problem. Though 
Sartre does state at one point that the past "is at the same 
time for-itself and in-itself," (HR, 119) this only complicates 
what appears as an insolvable pro1i!'em. 
460f• BN, 142. This view is reiterated numerous times 
in Sartre's discussion of temporality (cf. HR, 107-49) and in 
his consideration of the relation of freedom to the past (cf. 
mI, 496-504). 
47 Of. ![, 142. Though Sartra admits that the For-itself 
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The consideration of the ontological structure of the 
For-itself in its various dimensions thus manifests the funda-
mental unity of the For-itself. The For-itself is one, is 
actually undivided in self, in the sense that it exists as an 
interpenetration of distinct terms. That the For-itself's mode 
of unity is analogous to that of the In-i tsel! can be exempli-
fied, moreover, by considering the unity o! a stone. A stone, 
too, is actually undivided in itself, but in the sense of an 
inner cohesion of the same kind of matter admitting of no dis-
tinctions. Hence, i! unity is predicated analogously, instead 
of univocally, the Bartrean For-itself can be affirmed as one. 
But this affirmation of an analogical unity for the For-itsel! 
has been worked out in terms of a consideration of the onto-
logical structure of the For-itself--a structure which pervades 
each and every For-itself.48 Bartre, however, seeks to express 
a personal mode of unification for the individual For-itself. 
Thus the unity of the For-itself requires further examination. 
as present, as freedom, is independent of the past, he employs 
"independence" here to convey the For-itself's power of self-
determination and domination over the past, instead of to con-
vey the present's independence in existence from the past. Cf. 
!m.., 496-504. 
48In addition to the various dimensions of the ontolog-
ical structure of the For-itself considered, the consciousness-
blJdy union offers a striking illustration of the For-itself' s 
admission of distinction within unity. For, Bartre avers, the 
For-itself exists its body, its body being its point of in-
sertion in the world and point of view upon that world. Cf. 
Part Two, Chapter II, 80-85. 
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In repudiation of psychological methodology which 
attempts to analyze man in terms of abstract, original givens, 
Bartre asserts: 
Either in looking for the person, we encounter a 
useless, contradictory metaphYsical substance--or 
else the being whom we seek vanishes in a dust of 
phenomena bound together by external connections. 
But what each one of us requires in his very effort 
to comprehend another is that he should never have 
to resort to this idea of substance which is inhuman 
because it is well this side ot the human. Finally, 
the fact is that the being considered does not 
crumble into dust, and one can discover in him that 
unity--for which substance was only a caricature--
which must be a unity of responsibility, a unity 
agreeable or hateful, blamable and praiseworthy, in 
short personal. This unity, which is the being of 
the man UDder consideration, is a free unification, 
and this unification can not come atter a diversity 
which it unifies. • • • this is the unIfication of 
an ori~inal troject, a unification which should r2-
veal i selto us as a non-substantial absolute.4~ 
Thus, according to Bartre, I non-thetically affirm ~ actual 
undividedness in being by ~ lived assumption of responsibility 
for my past and future, as well as for my present. Moreover, I 
freely unity my being in terms ot my original pro~ect, my 
pro~ect ot being, my pro~ect to become God--the pro~ect which 
stands as the meaning of my freely chosen, concrete ends--the 
ends which I pursue in relating to my particular situation. As 
For-itself, then, I am a being whose concrete pro~ects reveal 
the "original way"50 in which I have chosen my being, m::r way ot 
relating to the world. Hence, that a particular For-itself 
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asserts its personal unity in terms of its assumption of re-
sponsibility for its actions across its history, in terms of 
its original project which stamps each of its concrete pro~ectst 
attests once more a Sartrean employment of an analogical notion 
of unity for the For-itself. 
Because Sartre views the For-itself as one across its 
- -
hi storz, the For-itself also emerges as a being having a type 
of identity with itself, since identity is traditionally con-
sidersd as the sameness, the oneness ot a thing with itself at 
two points of time or under different considerations. 51 More-
over, because It as this For-itself, do not collapse in~o the 
being of the In-itself and the being of the Other, because I, 
as this For-itself, am actually undivided in myself in virtue 
ot the interpenetration of rrrr distinct "terms," it can be said: 
"I am rrrrself." But what concrete manifestations of self-
identity does the Sartrean For-itself reveal? 
That the individual For-itself exists as a pre-
reflective self-consciousness assuming its past and pro~ecting 
its future involves its grasp of its self-identity across its 
history. For example, if someone asks me what I did this after-
noon, I would immediately respond: "I read a book." This 
response reveals that I as present grasp this past "I" who read 
the book as myself. Moreover, that I express pride or shame for 
510f• Klubertanz, Introduction!2.:!ill!. PhilosophY 2! 
Being, 80, 92. 
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my past actions, for those actions which are mine and define me 
from behind, manifests that I grasp this past "I" who had freely 
performed these actions as myself and thus assume responsibility 
for these past actions. Hence, what Bartre termed a "unity of 
responsibility" emerges as an expression of my identity--my one-
ness with myself across my history.52 
The Sartrean view of the For-itself's original project, 
a project reflected in each of its concrete projects, further 
attests the individual For-itself's oneness with self across its 
history. For, though I--as an individual For-itself--am per-
petually changing, am perpetually engaged in the process of 
self-construction, these changes "are, nevertheless, changes 
which I discover as changes 'in my lifet--that is, changes with-
in the unitary compass of a single project,"53 my project to 
become In-itself-For-itself, to become God. 54 My original 
project thus, according to Bartre, remains the same throughout 
my history. 
There are, however, other concrete evidences of my self-
identity acknowledged by Sartre. My perpetual constitution of 
myself as !!2!. In-itself affirms my oneness with self across my 
52There are numerous examples presented by Bartre in his 
discussion of temporality which attest his affirmation of the 
For-itself's self-identity. Cf.!N, 107-49. 
-
53!!, 553. 
54Cf• !!, 599. 
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history. Moreover, in my relation to the Other, in my reversal 
ot the Other's look, I reinforce my seltness. For, as Sartre 
states ot my constitution ot myselt as not the Other: 
This negation which constitutes my being and which, 
as Hegel said, makes me appear as the Same confront-
ing the Other, constitutes me on the ground ot a non-
thetic selfness as "Myself." We need not understand 
by this that a Self comes to dwell in our conscious-
ness but that se1fness is reinforced by arising as a 
negation of another se1fness and that this reinforce-
ment is positively apprehended as the continuous 
choice of selfness by itself as ~ same se1fness 
and as this very se1fness.55 
In terms of my wresting myse1f-as-object from the look of the 
Other and making the Other be object for me, I thus freely 
choose to affirm this self which I am throughout the duration 
of this relation, throughout my history. Then, too, since my 
body is lived by me as my insertion in the world of the In-
itself and the Other, since my body "represents the individual-
ization of my engagement in the world, .,56 my body at every 
point in my history "is present in every action. n57 Hence, 
from several Bartrean perspectives (the particular For-itself's 
original project; its assumption of responsibility for its past 
and its future, as well as its present; its body as lived 
55mJ, 28;. 
-~,;10. Bartre avers that the For-itself is its own 
individualIZation. Of.!N, ;10, 52;, 524, 599. In terms of 
its'metapbysical birth, iEls For-itself upsurges as a nihilation 
of a particular In-itself. Cf.![, 618. 
57!!, ;24. 
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throughout every action; its reinforcement of its very selfness 
through its constitution of itself as not the In-itself or the 
Other to which it relates), the individual For-itself manifests 
itself as having a sameness. a oneness with itself across its 
history. 
The individual For-itself, then. can be said to have 
what is traditionally termed a numerical identity--the basic 
sameness of one and the same individual throughout its dura-
tion. 58 But the individual For-itself is refused the same mode 
of identity as that of the In-itself. For example. a sto~e hae 
numerical identity in the sense that it remains the same 
passive, congealed, homogeneous matter, admitting of no intrin-
sic development and fixed by its physical boundaries throughout 
its duration. The individual For-itself, however, has numerical 
identity in the sense of a sameness with self against the back-
drop of contrast, of perpetual change, of perpetual self-
construction. Its numerical identity, moreover, is dynamically, 
though non-thetically, sustained across its history in terms of 
this For-itself's perpetual choice of its selfness, in terms of 
its perpetual renewal of its original project, in terms of its 
perpetual awareness of its responsibility for its past, present 
and future. Thus the Sartrean For-itself does have a numerical 
identity, but this identity must be predicated analogously. 
58Cf• Klubertanz, Introduction.:!!2. ~ Philosophy 9.!. 
Be ins , 80. 
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Does the Sartrean For-itself, hovever, admit ot a 
specific identity, an identiv,y which belongs to each and every 
For-itself qua For-itself? To allow a facile w~ of distin-
guishing this inquiry from the preceding one, let us rephrase 
this question. Let us ask whether the For-itself has a struc-
tural determinateness which belongs to each and every For-
itself qua For-itself. Inasmuch as Sartre presents an ontology 
in Being ~ Nothingness, an affirmative response can readily 
be given to this question. Every For-itself upsurges in the 
world as a relation to In-itself. Every For-itself emerges 
sustaining the self-relations described in Chapter I of Part 
Two. Every For-itself exists its body. Every For-itself is 
consciousness, freedom, choice, nihilation, temporalization. As 
Sartre himself asserts: "Naturally certain original structures 
are invariable and in each For-itself constitute human-
reality."59 Thus the For-itself, like the In-itsel~ emerges wit 
a structural determinateness. But, unlike the In-itself, unlike 
the stone, the For-itself's very structural determinateness 
casts the For-itself into the world as lack, as indeterminate, 
as a being which is self-determining, as a being which forges 
its own essence, as a being which t.t=mB,..k .... e -.s ~ himself ~ 2!B. 
gate,n60 as a being continually engaged in the process of self-
construction. Hence the For-itself's structural determinateness 
59BN, 456. 
-
60ml, 550. 
-
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is such that the For-itself, unlike the stone, must be a self-
determinining being, a being which seeks to escape its struc-
ture as lack, as indeterminateness, in a project forever un-
realized. 
Inasmuch as the For-itself has manifested itself as a 
being having an analogous numerical identity and structural 
determinateness, can it be concluded that the For-itself is also 
characterized by permanence? Prior to pursuing this question, 
it should be recognized that the numerical identity of a par-
ticular For-itself is a lived "reaffirmation" of its sameness 
with the self which is behind it in the past and the self which 
is ahead of it in the future. There must be such a dynamic, 
non-thetic "reaffirmation" since the Sartrean For-itself exists 
as flight trom its past and toward its future, exists as 
temporalization, as perpetually Changing.6l Similarly, in 
accord with the Sartrean system, there must be a dynamic, though 
no n-the tic , sustaining ot its very structural determinateness on 
the part of the For-itselt, since its structural determinate-
ness as lack 1s perpetuated only on the ground ot the For-
itself's continual nihilat10n of In-itself to which it is 
present. 62 Thus, while a mode of numerical identity and a mode 
610f• !!I, 323. 
62Because the structural determinateness of the For-
itself is perpetuated only on the ground of this For-itself's 
nihilat10n of In-itself, the "for-itselt causes a human-reality 
to exist as a species." (BN, 551) 
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of structural determinateness come to rest upon the Sartrean 
For-itself, they should not be so construed as to arrest the 
inherent dynamism of the For-itself as temporalization. But, 
if this is the case, can permanence be attributed to the 
Sartrean For-itself? 
The Sartrean repudiation of permanence for the For-
itself is staged against the backdrop of modern philosophy. 
Citing specifically Leibniz and Kant, Sartre condemns their 
consideration of the permanent as something apart from change, 
In opposition to the tradition of modern philosophy, he more-
over, asserts: 
The unity of change and the permanent is necessary 
for the constitution of change as such. • •• It 
must be a unity of beiltf. But such a unity of being 
amounts to requiring t at the permanent be that 
which changes, and hence the unity is at~e start 
ekstatic and refers to the For-itself inasmuch as 
the For-itself is essentially ekstatic being. • • • 
Moreover resorting to permanence in order to furnish 
the foundation for change is completely useless. 
What Kant and Leibniz want to show is that an ab-
solute change is no longer strictly speaking change 
since it is no longer based on ~hing which 
changes--or in relation to whic ere is change. 
But in fact if what changes is its former state in 
the past mode, this is suffiCient to make permanence 
superfluous. • •• Since this link with the past 
replaces the pseudo-necessity of permanence, the 
problem of duration can and ought to be posited in 
relation to absolute changes.63 
Because Sal.'tre views the For-itself as temporally ekstatic,. as 
continually changing (its future becoming its present and its 
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present submerging into its past), he thus rejects any perma-
nence that would render the For-itself a congealed, self-
coincident "what-it-is" across time. .And yet, while he posits 
absolute changes for the For-itself, he affirms that the For-
itself which changes is its former state in the past mode. This 
suggests that there is some mode of enduring for the For-itself. 
Furthering this viewpoint, moreover, is the Bartrean assertion 
regarding the upsurge of a "new" present: "We must guard 
against seeing here the appearance of a new being.u64 Then. 
too, Bartre avers: "The for-itself endures in the form of a 
non-thetic consciousness (of) enduring. n65 But, precisely, 
what is the endurlng element of the For-itself? 
IL cvnsidering the Bartrean answer to this question, it 
can be discerned that Bartre is rejecting a given, passive 
permanence for the For-itself. For he states: 
The For-itself is a temporalization. This means that 
it is not but that it "makes itself." It is the sit-
uatIOn which must account for that substantial perm-
anence which we readily recognize in people ("He has 
not changed." "He is always the same.") and which 
the person experiences empirically in most cases as 
being his own. The free perseverance in a single 
project does not imply any permanence; quite the con-
trary, it is a perpetual renewal of 1'11:3' engagement • • • 
64 m, 147. 
65sN, 150. Our considerations of the For-itself's 
numerical rcfentity and structural determinateness are also sug-
gestive of an enduring "element" for the For-itself, but they 
do not bring into focus what Sartre views as the ultimate ex-
pression of the For-itself's enduring "element." 
On the other hand, the realities enveloped and illum-
inated by a project which develops and confirms itself 
present the permanence of the in-itself; and to the 
extent that they refer our image to us, they support 
us with their everlastingness; in fact it frequently 
happens that we take their permanence for our own. In 
particular the permanence of place and enVironment. 
of the judgments passed on us by our fellowmen, of 
our past--all shape a degraded image of our persever-
ance. • •• It should be noted that this permanence 
of the past, of the environment, and of character are 
not given qualities; they are revealed on things ggly 
in correlation with the continuity of my project. 
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According to Sartre, then, it is the individual's "free per-
severance in a single project," a project perpetually renewed, 
that constitutes an enduring nelement" throughout the individ-
ual's history. Opposed to viewing the For-itself's permanence 
as passive, as gi "'en, Sar'tre wields the dynamism, the spon-
taneity, the freedom of the For-itself to enunciate a type of 
"permanence II which endure s only because the individual For-
itself perpetually renews its way of being in the world, its 
concrete expression of its project of being, at every point in 
its history, at every point in its adventure of self-
construction. Hence. if predicated analogously, a type of 
"permanence lt can be attributed to the For-itself, but it is a 
permanence which is perpetually renewed across perpetual change. 
It is not the same type of permanence which belongs to the In-
itself. to the stone; it is not a static, given endurance. 
There remains for consideration one further character-
istic ascribed to substance by the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
6~, 551-52. 
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tradition specifically: the capability to admit contrary qual-
ifications. The Sartrean For-itself, by definition, as the 
being which is \'lhat it is not and is not what it is, assuredly 
admits of such a capability.. Our very inquiry concerning the 
sUbstantialization of the For-itself, moreover, confirms the 
For-itsel!'s ability to admit contrary qualifications. For this 
inquiry has revealed the following observations regarding the 
Sartrean For-itself: 
(1) The For-itself is independent in its being 
from the In-itself and the Other inasmuch as it does 
not collapse into the being of the In-itself and the 
Other to which it is present; yet this very inde-
pendence is revealed across the For-itself's intrinsic 
dependence upon the In-itself and the Other in its 
perpetuation of itself as For-itself, as this For-
itself. 
(2) The For-itself is one inasmuch as it is 
actually undivided in itself and divided from others 
(independent); yet its very actual undividedness in 
itself is revealed as a dynamic interpenetration of 
its distinct "terms" or Itdimensions"; the very unity 
of the For-itself is thus revealed across its inner 
distances, across its inner "distinctions." 
(3) The For-itself has numerical identity with 
itself in the sense that it dynamically sustains a 
sameness with self across its history in terms of its 
assumption of responsibility for its past and its 
future, as well as its present, and in virtue of its 
perpetual renewal of its original choice of its being, 
of its way of relating to the world; this very numer-
ical identi~, however, is sustained across contrast--
the contras afforded by its perpetual process of 
self-construction, the contrast afforded by its inner 
distances, the contrast afforded by its being as 
temporalization. 
(4) The For-itself has structural determinateness 
inasmuch as each and every For-itself exists as a 
relation to In-itself, exists its body, exists the 
immediate structures of its self-relations, exists 
as lack, freedom, nihilation, choice, temporaliza-
tion--as consciousness; this very structural deter-
minateness, however, is such that it allows se11-
determInation on the part of the individual Por-
itse1? who perpetuates it through nihilating the 
In-itself; this structural determinateness, more-
over is such that it is manI1ested as lack, as 
indeterminateness, thereby revealing the For-itself 
as a being whlch forges its own essence, which con-
tinually engages in the process of self-construction. 
(5) The For-itself has permanence inasmuch as 
it perpetually renews its original project, its 
choice of its own way of relating to being, its 
concrete expression of the project to become In-
itself-For-itself, this permanence, however, as 
the perpetual renewal of a single project by the 
free For-itself, is sustained across the history 
of the For-itself, across its perpetually changing 
being. 
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That the For-itself is a being capable of admitting contrary 
qualifications is thus evinced by this reconsideration of its 
other "substantial" characteristics.6? 
Summary 
The investigation of the question as to whether Sartre 
has substantialized the For-itself has hence shown that tra-
ditional characteristics of substance are assigned to the Sar-
trean For-itself. But, as a general methodical practice 
6?That the For-itself is capable of admitting contrary 
qualifications could equally well be evinced by a reconsidera-
tion of the relations discussed in Part Two. But there is no 
need to belabor a consideration of what is the most obvious 
"~ubstantial" characteristic of the For-itself. 
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stemming from his view of the For-itself as a dynamic, nihila-
ting temporalization, Bartre disengages these characteristics--
as predicated of the For-itself--from their traditional context 
as the given. This disengagement has two important implica-
tions; (1) Sartre rejects outright the attempt of modern phi-
losophy to treat man as a given, insular, non-changing "what-
it-is," to view man as substance in this sense, and (2) he re-
pudiates any univocal predication of independence, unity, 
identity, determinateness, permanence to man and In-itself. 
Are we to conclude, then, that Bartre has substantialized the 
For-itself on the basis of an analogical predication of sub-
stantial characteristics? The answer to this question should 
be delayed since there remains another approach to this issue. 
CHAPTER II 
THE FOR-ITSELF AS THE SOURCE OF CATEGORIES 
In an effort to gain further information concerning the 
question of a Sartrean sUbstantialization ot the For-itselt, it 
would be well to consider the ontological status ot the For-
itself as it is actually operative in Sartre's account of the 
origination ot categories ot being. Such a consideration, more-
over, admits ot a dual strategy: it provides us with another 
approach to the issue of substantialization and it allows us 
direct access to an examination ot the Sartrean manipulation ot 
the For-itselt as the source of categories applicable to being. 
This final investigation should thus be informative not only 
with respect to the question ot a substantialization ot the For-
itselt, but also with regard to the ultimate question concern-
ing whether the For-itselt can bear the burden ot its ontolog-
ical task ot issuing categories ot being. It would, however, 
be well to review the relationship ot these two questions and 
the Sartrean thesis regarding the task ot the For-itself. 
As discussed in Part one,l Sartre wields Spinoza's 
dictum: "All determination is negation" to claim that all de-
termination springs trom negation. In the Sartrean system, then 
lCt. Part One, 24-25. Ct. BN, 180-86. 
-
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the ontological burden of issuing all the determinations in the 
world, of issuing categories of being, falls to the For-itself 
since only the For-itself exists as negation. Thus, relation, 
space, motion, temporality, the one and the many, quality, 
quantity, potentiality, instrumentality, beauty, value--all 
come to the world through human reality.2 But the Sartrean 
assignment of this ontological task to the For-itself poses a 
question which can be formulated in the following way: Can the 
For-itself as relation bear the burden of issuing categories of 
being applicable to a region of being so onto logically dis-
simila~ from it, to the region of In-itself, to the Sartrean 
region of substance? There are, moreover, two grounds for 
raising this question. First, within the Sartrean system, the 
For-itself's dependence upon the In-itself confirms the onto-
logical priority of the In-itself and yet the burdensome onto-
logical task of originating categories falls to the For-itself. 
This disproportion between the ontological priority of the In-
itself and the ontological functioning of the For-itself thus 
gives cause for questioning the Sartrean perspective. Secondly, 
the lack of a common ground between the For-itself as relation 
and the In-itself as substance appears to jeopardize Sartre's 
employment of the For-itself as the source of categories of 
being. Both of these grounds for questioning the Sartrean 
20f• !N, 180-216 for Sartre's discussion of the manner 
in which human reality brings these determinations into the 
world. 
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thesis would, however, be mitigated somewhat if Bartre sub-
stantialized the For-itself. 3 Hence, as we approach a selective 
consideration of categories issuing from the For-itselt~4 we 
should be attentive not only to the question of the ontological 
status of the For-itself, but also to the ultimate question of 
the For-itself's capability to bear the ontological burden of 
issuing categories of being. 
It is the Bartrean view that the For-itself in relating 
to In-itself causes the "this" to emerge against the backdrop 
of the totality of undifferentiated In-itself. As the corre,-
late of intentional activity, the lIthis," in other words, arises 
across the ground of the totality as "the being which I at 
present 2 not. ,,5 But what is the relation of quality to the 
"thisll? 
Defining quality as "nothing other than the being of the 
this when it is considered apart from all external relation with 
3It should be noted that an affirmation of the substan-
tialization of the For-itself, if this be the conclusion, does 
not necessarily imply the For-itself's capability to bear the 
ontological burden of originating categories of being. 
4It is neither necessary nor possible within the scope 
of this thesis to consider all the categories which Sartre 
views as issuing from the For-itself. An examination of qual-
ity, quantity and potentiality is sufficient for enunciating 
the theme common to Sartre's wielding of the For-itself as the 
source of all determination. 
5 !!i, 182. 
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the world or with other thises,,,6 Sartre claims that the "this" 
is nothing but the total interpenetration of its qualities. To 
illustrate this view, he avers that the yellow of a lemon is 
its sourness and vice versa. Not only is the lemon extended 
throughout all its qualities, but each of its qualities is ex-
tended throughout each of the others. Quali ty is thus not an 
external aspect of being. However, for there to be quality, 
for the qualities of a being to be differentiated, requires the 
presence of a For-itself. But, specifically, how does the 
"this" come to have distinctive qualities? How does its un-
differentiated unity emerge as differentiated? 
In answer to such questions, Sartre asserts: 
It is the for-itself which can deny itself from various 
points of view when confronting the this and which re-
veals the quality as a new this on the ground of the 
thing. For each negating act by which the freedom of 
the For-itself spontaneously constitutes its being, 
there is a corresponding total revelation of being "in 
profile." This profile is nothing but a relation of 
the thing to the For-itself, a relation realized by 
the For-itself. It is the absolute determination of 
negativity, for it is not enough that the for-itself 
by an original negation should not be being nor that 
it should not be this being; in order for its deter-
mination as the nothIngness of being to be full, the 
for-itself must realize itself as a certain unique 
manner of not being this being. This absolute de-
termination, which is the determination of quality 
as a profile of th~ "this," belongs to the freedom 
of the For-itself.' 
According to Sartre, then, my perceiving this paper as white is 
Gmi, 186. 
-
?BN 188. 
-' 
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what reveals this quality across the undifferentiated unity of 
this page. Moreover, through such a perception, I am conscious-
ness of the impossibility of existing as color, as white, as a 
what-it-is. To perceive this color, then, involves my aware-
ness of self as the internal negation of this color, as not 
this color, as other than this other, as independent. I thus 
come to know myself and to constitute my being by my free en-
gagement with the "this," an engagement which is a determination 
of quality, "the indication of what we are not and of the mode 
of being which is denied to us."8 But what is the ontological 
status of the For-itself as the source of determinations of 
quality? 
As manifested in the Sartrean discussion, the For-
itself issues a determination of quality through a negating act 
in terms of which its being is constituted. As negation, the 
For-itself thus constitutes itself as not the "this," as not 
the particular quality, as denied "the mode of being" of the 
quality, and hence as independent in its mode of being. More-
over, in terms of its internal negation, the For-itself has an 
awareness of self which manifests that it is a being with a 
mode of identity and a mode of unity. Hence, the For-itself, in 
its issuance of the determination of quality, reveals itself as 
having certain substantial characteristics which, of course, 
8m, 187. 
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would have to be considered in the analogous context discussed 
in the preceding chapter. 
Quantity 
As the "this" arises only through the intentional ac-
tivity of the For-itselt, so, too, with the "this-that." 
According to Bartre, however, not only do two "thises" emerge 
against the backdrop ot the unditferentiated totality ot In-
itself through the negating act of the For-itself, but an ex-
ternal negation between the "this" and the "that" appears as 
well through the For-itself's presence to being. Yet, this 
external negation between the "this" and the ttthat, tt Bartre 
avers, belongs in no way to the "thises" considered. That 
there II a separation between "thises" hence constitutes only 
an ideal separation which is simply what it is--an ideal sep-
aration In-itself--and which thus belongs neither to the being 
of the For-itself nor to the baing of the flthises. fI It is this 
ideal separation In-itself which Bartre terms quantity.9 
To illustrate his viaw of quantity as pure exteriority, 
Bartre considers an example of counting--the making of "an 
idaal distinction inside a totality capable ot disintegration 
and already given. rt10 Ha claims that, it there are three men 
conversing opposite ma, I do not count them in terms ot an 
9 Cf. BN, 189-91. 
-
109, 191. 
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initial apprehension ot them as a group. When I do count them 
as three, the fact ot my counting, since it issues a purely ex-
ternal and negative relation among the members of the group, in 
no wq ;jeopardizes the concrete unity ot the group; the group is 
lett perfectly intact. Thus "three" is not a concrete property 
of the group, but neither is it a concrete property of the mem-
bers of the group. For, Sartre avers, we cannot speak of a:rJ'3' 
member as "three" or even as a "third," since the quality of 
"third" depends on the freedom of the For-itselt who is count-
ing. Each man .2!!\ be the "third," but being the "third" belongs 
to the being ot no man, because it is an ideal character de-
pendent upon the choice of the For-itself who is doing the 
counting. Hence, the For-itself's introduction of quantity adds 
nothing to being but an ideal separation. As Sartre states: 
"It ~ti~ is isolated and detached from the surface of the 
world as a reflection of nothingness cast on being."ll 
~hat the category of quantity, issued by the For-itself 
in virtue of its relation to being, belongs neither to the being 
of the For-itself nor to the being of the "thises" has serious 
ram.1tications.12 For it appears that, even though the For-
itself continues to evince its independence in mode of being 
tram the In-itselt as it originates categories and thus contin-
ues to manifest this chief "substantial" characteristic, it is 
11H , 191. 
12 at. H, 190-91. 
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incapable--whether substantialized or not--to issue categories 
having metaphysical import. But this view requires further in-
vestigation. 
Potentiality 
In elucidating the manner in which the For-itself 
brings certain potentialities to the In-itself, Sartre empha-
sizes his view of the For-itself as a being which is always 
about to come to itself. The importance of this view in the 
present context lies in the fact that the For-itself, as the 
internal negation of the In-itself to which it is present, 
denies with the dimension of a future. It is in terms of the 
For-itself's relation to its future that potentialities come to 
rest lightly upon In-itself to which the For-itself is present. 
Permanence, for example, comes to the In-itself from the 
future. As Sartre states: 
In so far as the for-itself denies itself in the 
future, the this concerning which it makes itself 
a negation is revealed as coming to itself from 
the future. • •• The revelation of the table 
as table requires a permanence of table which 
comes to it from the future and-which is not a 
purely established given, but a potentiality.13 
Hence, because I consider the table within the dimension of my 
relation to my future, a potentiality of permanence comes to 
the table--a potentiality which is correlative to my future. 
There are, however, other potentialities manifest in 
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the "this." For example, Bartre claims, the For-itself as a 
relation to its future is beyond the crescent moon to which it 
is present and thus the full moon becomes the potentiality of 
the crescent moon. This potentiality of the crescent, however, 
remains purely external to it, since the crescent is fully what 
it is and needs nothing other in order to be what it is--a 
crescent. Bartre maintains: "Potentiality on the ground of 
the future turns back on the this to determine it, but the re-
lation between the this as ir.\-ilise1f and i ts potentiality is 
an external re1ation."14 Pushing ahead this view of poten-
tialities being in a state of indifference in relation to the 
"this," he considers the example of an inkwell which ~ be 
broken. This potentiality of being shattered, however, is 
totally cut off from the inkwell, because it is only the cor-
relate of ~ possibility to shatter it. In itself, Bartre 
claims, "the inkwell is neither breakable nor unbreakable; it 
is.,,15 It is thus the Sartrean thesis that potentiality comes 
-
to rest lightly on the In-itself as the meaning of being beyond 
the present "this," as a meaning introduced in the world through 
the intentional activity ot the For-itself. As he states: 
"Here again knowledge adds nothing to being and removes nothing 
trom it; knowledge adorns it with no new quality. It causes 
1~, 196. 
15!l, 196. 
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being to-be-there by surpassing it toward a nothingness whioh 
enters into only negative exterior relations with it. ttl6 
Henoe, though the For-itself oasts its potent1alizing per-
speotive upon the In-itself to whioh it relates, the In-itself 
remains indifferent to suoh deposited potentialities. The oat-
egory of potentiality thus appears as an ideal category issuing 
from the intentional activity of the For-itself, the being 
which, as "potentializer," manifests itself as independent in 
the face of its dependence on the In-itself to which it is 
present, as ~ in virtue of the interpenetration of its present 
and future and as identical with self in the sense of grasping 
its future self as a mode of its being, as its being to come. 
Summary 
On the grounds of thls selective consideration of cate-
gories emanating from the For-itself as it relates to the In-
itself, it can be ascertained that Sartre has again stooked the 
For-itself with certain "substantial" oharacteristics, chief 
among which is the For-itself's independence in mode of being 
and as freedom, an independence revealed across the backdrop of 
the For-itself's intrinsic dependence on In-itself. It can, 
moreover, be observed that Sartre has enoployed the For-itself to 
issue categories of being which are only ideal categories, as 
opposed to metaphysical categories. But such observations are 
Ih---
-BN, 197. 
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not enough. A stance must be taken upon the chief issues of 
this thesis--the issue of the substantialization of the For-
itself and the issue of the Sartrean employment of the For-
itself as the source of categories of being. 
PART FOUR 
OONCLUSIONS: THE METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS 01 MAN AS RELATION 
Our attempt to glean metaphysical implications from the 
Sartrean theory of man as relation has been staged in terms of 
questioning Bartre's employment of the For-itself to issue cat-
egories of being. This ultimate question has afforded us 
access not only to an inquiry concerning the meaning of the For-
itself as relation, but also to the further question of a pos-
sible, Sartrean substantialization of the For-itself. All these 
questions, however, have been posed trom two perspectives which 
demand comment. 
First, from within the Sartrean system, it initially 
appears paradoxical that the For-itself as relation should issue 
categories of being which are applicable to the region of In-
1 tself, to the Bartrean region of ,substance. How can the For--
itself, so onto logically dissimilar from the In-itself, be 
manipulated by Sartre to draw out such categories! That Sartre 
assigns this task solely to the For-itself, however, has a 
serious ramification for the Sartrean proclamation that the For-
itself is relation, not substance. For, what type of relation 
is the For-itself if it can stand apart from the In-itself to 
perform this ontological feat? More pointedly, what type of 
relation is the For-itself if it must stand apart from the In-
itself to which it relates, if it must ~~ the In-itself to 
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which it relates, in order to originate categories? Still 
, 
again, what type of relation is the For-itself if it manifests 
~ independence in mode of being from the In-itself to which it 
relates? Since Sartre himself affirms independence as the chief 
characteristic of substance,l there are grounds inherent in his 
own system for considering whether he has substantialized the 
For-itself. Thus, each of the questions we have raised emerge 
from tensions wi thin the Sartrean system itself. 
There is, however, a second perspective from which the 
principal questions of this thesis can be posed--the perspective 
of the philosophic tradition. Across the history of philosophy, 
until relatively recent times, those who engaged in metaphysics 
viewed a doctrine of substance as a central topic, if not the 
pivotal doctrine, in the construction of a theory of being. 
Substance rose t·') the forefront to perform a variety of meta-
physical tasks dependent upon the particular metaphysical 
system. Relation, however, in general, was relegated to a rel-
atively insignificant role as an accidental modality of sub-
stance. Thus, when Sartre, though admittedly not a meta-
physician, declares that the For-itself as relation issues 
categories of being, the declaration engages the interest of 
one nurtured in the metaphysical tradition recorded in the his-
tory of philosophy. That Sartre, moreover, em.ploys the For-
itself to cause categories only adds further fuel to the 
1m, 506. 
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interest of one metaphysically oriented. since he has thereby 
placed a greater burden upon the For-itself as relation than 
that placed upon substance by the traditional metaphysicians who 
employ individual substances for purposes of discerning the 
various 5ive~ modalities of beings.2 Hence, from the vantage 
point of traditional metaphysics, the question concerning 
whether the For-itself can bear the burden of issuing categories 
and the inquiry regarding a possible, Sartrean substantializa-
tion of the For-itself quite naturally arise. 
The principal issues of this thesis have thus been 
posed from the dual perspective of the Sartrean system itself 
and the general, metaphysical tradition. But from what per-
spective are these issues to be resolved? Because the issues 
which concern us arise from tensions within the Sartrean system, 
it is necessar.1 to go beyond this system itself for answers. 
Are we to look, then, to a traditional, metaphysical viewpoint 
as a guideline for settling these questio:as? Because the 
Sartrean system, in our opinion, manifests both a certain orig-
inality and an advancement over past philosophic sy~tems in 
some respects, it is also necessary to go beyond the context 
2The tradition specifically referred to in this context 
is the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. ~he contrast between 
the Sartrean view of the For-itself as cause of categories and 
the Aristotelian-Thomistic analysis of substances for purposes 
of enunciating ~iven modalities of being suggests the px"ofound 
difference in t eir employment of the phrase "categories of 
belng,U the difference between ideal modalities and real modal-
ities. But this difference will be dealt with in more detail 
shortl • 
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of a historical dialogue. Thus, the conclusions reached with 
regard to the questions of this thesis must come from our own 
assessment of the Sartrean system and its contributions to a 
perennial metaphysics. 
~ Question 2! Substantialization 
On the basis of the ground already traversed with 
respect to this question, it should be evident that the Sartrean 
refusal of substantiality for the For-itself pivots upon his 
repudiation of a univocal predication of substance to all 
beings. To view both man and stone alike as an insular, to-
tally self-contained, non-changing what-it-is constitutes, 
according to Sartre, the substantialist illusion to which 
Descartes, Leibniz and Kant fell prey. Working out of this 
historical context, Sartre thus signals his rejection of such 
sUbstantialism by declaring: "The For-itself is relation." 
And yet, as evidenced in our discussion of the characteristics 
of the For-itself, it appears that substantial characteristics 
do come to rest upon the For-itself if they be predicated 
analogously. Has Sartre, then, substantialized the For-itself 
in an analogous fashion? 
~ chief requirement which any "X" must meet in order 
to be termed a .. substance" is an ability to stand apart from 
other fiX'S. It Both the philosophical tradition and Bartre 
assess independence in being as the principal trait of any 
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substance, an assessment with which we concur. To the extent, 
then, that the For-itself constitutes itself as ~ the In-
itself to which it relates through knowledge and action, to the 
extent that the For-itself constitutes itself as not the Other 
-
to which it relates, to the extent that the For-itself ~ order 
~ issue categories must constitute itself as ~ the In-itself 
to which it relates, to the extent that the For-itself in seek-
ing to grasp an In-itself always falls back upon itself as For-
itself, it may be said that the For-itself is substantialized. 
But why has Sartre failed to concede this substantialization? 
The "failure" in this case appears to rest not with 
Bartre, but with the metaphysical tradition. Substantia1ist 
philosophies have refused to admit internal relations as com-
patible with an independence in being. Thus, since Bartre 
claims that the For-itself is internally related to the world, 
he could not, even if he so desired, term the For-itself "sub-
stance" in a traditional sense. But what of the substances in 
our experience? Does experience evince the Sartrean view or 
the traditionalist view? Perhaps, a stone is not intrinsically 
dependent upon other things; perhaps, a stone could ~ in a 
vacuum. But what about me? I cannot exist even as a vegetable 
in a vacuum; I need air and food to exist even on this minimal 
level of animate life. Since my continuance in existence hinges 
on these necessities of life, I am in a very real sense in-
trinsically dependent upon them. Moreover, as consciousness, I 
1% 
require objects to know; as freedom, I require something to 
choose, something to act upon; as a being with possibles, I 
require the world in order to gain a self-consciousness of what 
I lack, in order to project my possibles. I am thus intrinsi-
cally dependent upon things and others in the world. And yet, 
while I would not be this For-itself without such an internal 
relationship, I do not collapse into the being of the things 
to which I relate, of the Others to which I relate. I stand 
apart in the face of intrinsic dependence. The employment of 
experience as a sounding-board thus evinces the Sartrean recon-
ciliation of an independence in being with an internal related-
ness in the case of the For-itself. Aside from the perspective 
of traditional metapbysics, it can hence be maintained that the 
For-itself is substantialized to the extent that it does stand 
apart from others. This position, however, can be maintained 
only on the foundation of an analogous predication of substance, 
of independence in being. For, as I refuse a univocity of sub-
stance based on the being of stones, stones refuse a univocity 
of substance based on being-for-itself. In his polemic with 
traditional substantialists who would admit only external re-
lations as compatible with independence in being, Sartre has 
thus shown metaphysicians that differing regions of being must 
be examined before metaphysical conclusions are asserted and 
that the analogous character of these assertions must be 
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explicated and exemplified. 
But what of the other traditional characteristics of 
substance? Though we have suggested ways in which the Sartrean 
For-itself appears to manifest such traditional characteristics 
as unity, identity, structural determinateness, permanence and 
the admission of contrary qualifications, we must now assess 
the precise relation of the Sartrean For-itself to the tra-
ditionalist view.' Because Sartre considers the For-itself as 
temporalization, as flight, he not only disengages such char-
acteristics from the traditionalist stance of being givens, but 
also disengages the For-itself from the notion of an enduring 
subject. This dual disengagement comes to cast a different 
light upon the For-itself's "substantial" characteristics. 
First, the For-itself's admission of contrary qualitications 
must be here and now, since the For-itself is the present tem-
poralizing itself. Secondly, the unity and structural de-
terminateness ot the For-itself would have to be dynamically 
asserted at every upsurge of the present. Thirdly, the iden-
tity and "permanence" of the For-itself could not be considered 
in traditionalist terms as the It same" and the "unchanged, It but 
would have to be viewed from the perspective ot the continuity 
of the For-itself across its history. The In-itself character 
of the past, however, emerges to create problems. For the past 
'Ct. Part Three, Chapter I, 112-27. 
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as In-itself would appear to disrupt the unity of the For-itself 
not only.on the level of temporal unity, but also on the levels 
of the For-itself-body unity and the unity claimed in the act of 
reflection, since both the body and the consciousness reflected-
on are considered as in the immediate past. Moreover, because 
the past is the For-itself become In-itself, Sartre avers that 
the For-itself as present undergoes absolute changes and yet 
suggests a continuity of the For-itself across its history by 
repudiating the appearance of a new being. But how can the For-
itself be granted such continuity if the past as In-itself is 
outside the For-itself as present, if the For-itself can wrench 
itself from its past ~ nihilation, if the For-itself emerges 
as though it were starting at zero in every present? It would 
thus appear that the For-itself cannot sustain even analogues 
of traditionalist characteristics of substance. Yet, Sartre's 
concrete descriptions of the For-itself would enrich any sub-
stantialist perspective and, in a sense, it can be said that 
the For-itself functions as if it were "substance," but without 
foundation. 
To clarify this view that the For-itself functions as 
if it were "substance," but without foundation, it is necessary 
to consider what we mean by "substance" in this context. Cer-
tainly, the Sartrean For-itself does not function as if it were 
a Cartesian substance. Certainly, the Sartrean For-itself re-
fuses any notion of substance predicated univocally of man and 
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stone. And yet, Sartre's rich descriptions of the For-itself 
are suggestive of a certain view of "substance" which must now 
be enunciated. 
What do we mean by "substance"? Consider first a stone. 
This stone, to the extent that it stands apart from other 
actualities, to the extent that its physical boundaries mark it 
off from the grass, has an independence in actuality. The con-
gealed, solidified state of its matter, moreover, is indicative 
of an actual undiv1dedness or unity. Then, too, its retention 
of its matter and boundaries across time manifests a continuity 
with itself.4 That the stone is a certain type of matter, 
furthermore, indicates a structural determinateness. In the 
case of the stone, these characters, however, are given; the 
stone in no way acts to sustain its independence, unity, con-
tinuity and structural determinateness. Because its structural 
determinateness is given in completion, the stone, moreover, 
admits of only external relation.s, admits of only extrinsic 
dependence upon others. The torce of rain, for example, can 
move the stone to another place on a hill, as well as make it 
wet. Yet these conditions rest lightly on the stone, since its 
integrity as this stone requires no intrinsic dependence upon 
others. But so much for the stone. 
4The notion ot continuity is being introduced as a sub-
stitute tor the traditional notion of identity in order to allo 
a departure trom the traditional metaphysical implications ot 
the notion of sameness. 
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What allows me to call mysel~ "substance"? To the ex-
tent that I am bodied, I, like the stone, have physical bound-
aries which mark me off from other actualities. This inde-
pendence is a given. I, however, unlike the stone, have another 
level of independence--my freedom. I come into the world as an 
actuality with the potential of self-determination. Though this 
potential is a given, my actuation of it is not. It is I who 
am continually engaging in the process of self-construction ~ 
my free acts. Each act, as free, is a further realization of my 
selfhood and to that extent a further realization of my standing 
apart from others. Hence, my independence is affirmed at 
various levels--as a given physical independence, as a given 
potential of self-determination, and as ~~ independence forged 
by myself in the further realization of my selfhood. 
My independence, unlike that of the stone, however, is 
such that it is compatible with my intrinsic dependence upon 
other actualities. That I, unlike the stone, require internal 
relations to other actualities is rooted in my structural de-
terminateness. Though I came into the world, like the stone, 
wi~h a given structural determinateness, my structural deter-
minateness is a given potential, a potential with a given limit. 
I came into the world as an actuality given the potential for 
realizing the perfection of myself as a rational an1~l; to be 
this rational animal in the state of completion, as this stone 
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is a stone in the state ot completion, is my given limit and 
goal. In order to actuate my consciousness, my freedom, in 
order to engage in the process of self-realization, I, however, 
require the world. I require other actualities to know, to act 
upon. I require other "I'stl to communicate with, to love. I 
require the world in order to realize my concrete possibles 
which arise in terms of my project to attain my given limit. I 
require the world, then, to concretize the given structural de-
terminateness wl'.t:f.ch I exist. The world thus stands as the 
source of data for my self-construction, for m::r self-realization 
of this given potential, for my furthering my individualized 
approach to the given 11m! t. Hence, though I am independent, I 
am intrinsically dependent upon other actualities in the process 
of realizing my given potential, in the process of constructing 
myself. 
If I am continually in the process of selt-realization, 
it I am perpetually changing, have I no identity with selt? 
Do I not have a basic sameness with self' across my history? To 
the extent that I am perpetually furthering my approach to a 
given limit, I cannot say that I am the same "I" that I was ten 
years ago, ten minutes ago. I can and do express, however, a 
continuity with that I of ten years ago because I today am a 
turther dewlopment ot that I of ten years ago. Tha:b I assume 
responsibility tor the actions ot this past I, moreover, 
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indicates a continuity. A theory of continuity, however, de-
mands a theory of time which admits of the past as given in the 
.. present. A man who had a heart attack two years ago takes 
certain precautions today because the body of today ~s a 
further development of the body of two years ago and thus has 
an inherent heart condition. Then, too, a person who speaks of 
having a deeper understanding or a deeper love of someone in-
dicates a cumulative act, indicates the immanence of the past in 
the present. That the past is immanent in the present, more-
over, need not swallow up my freedom. For, while my past is 
immanent in my present, I, as present, am relating to the world 
of today, a world in terms of which I can pro~ect new concrete 
possibles, a world offerins novel data for my process of self-
construction. The novelty of the present. in other words, 
precludes its immanence in my past and thereby precludes the 
,functioning ot my past as a determinant of my present actions. 
A theory of continuity, worked out in terms of the notion of 
the immanence of the past in the present, can be applied then 
to a tree actuality, to the "I." There are thus several ways 
in which my continuity across my history can be expressed. To 
the extent that I am a selt-realizing actuali~, it is I who 
ngive" continuity across my history to the given potential 
which constitutes my structural determinateness, for it is I 
who further the actualization of that given potential. To the 
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extent that my past is immanent in my present, providing with 
my present a backdrop for my future, my continuity is again 
secured. In other words, to the extent that I do not emerge in 
every present as though I were starting at zero, the immanence 
of my past in my present is a given. Yet, as a conscious, free 
actuality, I can assert my continuity across my history by 
acknowledging responsibility for my actions--past, ,as well as 
present. Unlike myself, the stone, however, has only a sheer 
given continuity across time. 
Inasmuch as my determinate structure is a given po-
tential, I thus exist as the actualization of that potential. 
My structural determinateness cannot be construed as an element 
of sameness, of permanence, throughout change, since as a po-
tential is furthered from day to day, from moment to moment, I 
cannot say that I have the same structural determinateness that 
I had ten years ago, ten minutes ago. To assert with the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, tor example, that I remain 
specifically the same across my history is either to do meta-
physics on a formalistic level or to take me for a stone---or, 
perhaps, both. Are we to say, then, that there is no permanent 
element, no element of sameness across my history? There is an 
element of sameness, there is an unchanged element: the given 
limit, but It across my history, only further my approach to 
this limit; I never attain it. What is this limit which 
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functions simultaneously as a goal? Self-completion, self-
fulfillment, self-perfection in the sense of having attained the 
total actualization of my given potential, in the sense of 
having no more options because I have realized all! Because 
this limit and goal cannot be attained by me, because this limit 
and goal can only be approached, my determinate structure, un-
like that of the stone, remains open, to be closed only by my 
death and even then as incomplete. 
What of my unity? To what extent am I actually un-
divided in self? 
isting its body. 
I appear in the world as a consciousness ex-
This unity is a given and yet a given which is 
a potential for continuation or division. Unlike the stone, 
then, I must eat, drink and so on to sustain this unity. I, 
as consciousness, as a self-determining actuality, also mani-
fest my unity in terms of my continued actualization of a given 
potential, in terms of a single, cumulative endeavor. To the 
extent that my past is immanent in my present, providing with 
my present a backdrop for my future, my selfhood permeates my 
temporal dimensions at each degree of its realization. Then, 
too, since I acknowledge responsibility for my actions across 
my hietor-y, I affirm. TJJ.y oneness. Finally, because my multiple 
activities in my process of self-construction are ordered to a 
single limit and goal, self-completion, my unity is again 
attested. 
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Having considered the stone and myself as "substances," 
we must summarize our requirements for "substance.tI A substance 
is an actuality which can stand apart from other actualities, 
thoug~ not to the exclusion of a relatedness to others (external 
in the case of the stone; internal, as well as external in the 
case of ~self). A substance is an actuality existing a given 
determinate structure (complete in the case of the stone; a 
given potential in the case of myself). A substance, finally, 
is an actuality having unity and continuity across time (given 
in the case of the stone; with both given and self-determined 
features in the case of ~self). Buch are our requirements for 
predicating "substance" of an "X." That "substance" must be 
predicated analogously of the stone and ~self is, moreover, 
our contention. 
We can now clarify our view that the Sartrean For-
itself functions as if it were "substance," in the preceding 
sense, but without foundation. Certainly Bartre's general 
perspective and rich descriptions regarding the For-itself sug-
gest that Bartre acknowledges the fact of the For-itself's 
structural determinateness, unity, continuity and independence. 
Yet th~ ramifications of the Sartrean ontology are such that 
minimally the "fact tl of the For-itselfts unity and continuity 
is without foundation. Because Bartre avers that the past is 
the For-itself become In-itself, because he views the For-itself 
l~ 
and the In-itself as antithetical, he cannot ground the temporal 
unity or the continuity of the For-itself as For-itself. For 
such unity or continuity is disrupted by his insistence that the 
For-itself as freedom, as spontaneity, can wrench itself from 
its past, can start, as it were, at zero with the upsurge of 
each present. That the past, for Bartre, is outside the pres-
ent, that the past is In-itself in character, moreover, poses a 
question as to whether he can ground ontologically the unity of 
the For-itself in the act of reflection and the body-
consciousness unity. Sartra's refusal of an immanence of the 
past in the present, however, is but one instance of Bartre's 
general repudiation of admitting givens as immanent within the 
For-itself. Even the structural determinateness of the For-
itself as lack is such that it is not given, but perpetually 
renewed by the present For-itself. This general repudiation of 
the immanence of givens in the present For-itself thus renders 
the For-itself a being which is pure spontaneity, which is ab-
solute freedom, and which hence can stand apart from the In-
itself to which it relates. But, while its spontaneity, its 
freedom, its nih1lating activity, secure the For-itself's 
ability to stand apart from the In-itself, these very charac-
ters work to undermine the For-itself's continuity, to call into 
question certain levels of the For-itself's unity and to burden 
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the For-itself with the sheer selt-determination of its struc-
tural determinateness as lack. We thus conclude that the In-
itself character of the past and the absolute freedom of the 
For-itself as present work against each other so as to preclude 
an ontological foundation for affirming that the For-itself is 
"substance." If Sartre would simultaneously give more weight 
to his notion of facticity and temper the freedom of the For-
itself. then perhaps a substantialized For-itself would emerge. 
But such a For-itself does not emerge from the pages of Being 
~ Nothingness. 5 
~ For-itself ~ Categories .2L Being 
Our original question to Sartre was: Oan the For-
itself. as relation. bear the ontological burden of issuing 
categories of being? As we reconsider our selective treatment 
of the categories of quality. quantity and potentiality. we 
recognize a peculiar twist to this inquiry. For, whether the 
For-itself can bear the burden or not, the categories have no 
metaphysical import for the In-itself. According to Bartre, no 
category can "appear as an objective characteristic of the 
thing, if we understand by objective that which by nature be-
longs to the in-itself--or that which in one way or another 
50f• W. Desan, The TrafiC Finale, 144--59 for a consid-
eration of the unity ana-fdent tY of the For-itself but from 
the standpoint of the Sartrean repudiation of the Ego. 
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really constitutes the object as it is."6 And, again, he main-
tains that the categories issued by the For-itself are only 
tithe ideal mixing of things which leaves them wholly intact, 
without either enriching or impoverishing them by one iota; 
they merely indicate the infinite diversity of ways in which the 
freedom of the for-itself can realize the indifference of 
being. n7 Hence, in virtue of Sartre's limited and impoverished 
view of the region of non-human things, of the region of In-
itself, the For-itself's issuance of categories can have no 
metaphysical import tor the In-itself. 
But the question still remains as to whether the For-
itself can bear the burden of issuing categories which Bartre 
labels "ideal"? In attempting to answer this question, it 
should be noted that the Bartrean reference to ideality is a 
limited one. For Sartre is not suggesting that the categories 
are merely subjective whims of the For-itself. He explicitly 
asserts that the For-itself's issuance of the categories "can 
not be a way of disposing and of classifying phenomena vb-i.ch 
would exist only as subjective phantoms, nor can it 'subject-
ivize' being in so far as its revelation is constitutive of the 
For-its$lf. n8 Ref\lsing a radical subjectivism, Bartra thus 
claims that the For~,i tself' s issuance of categories requires the 
~, 185. 
7BN 191-92. 
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For-itse1f's presence to a "this," to a brute In-itself. What, 
then, is the status of the categories? Neither subjective nor 
objective, the categories, Bartre maintains, "remain 'in the 
air,' exterior to the For-itself as well as to the In-itse1f. n9 
Hence, the Bartrean categories are modalities of meaning thrust 
upon the brute In-itself by the For-itself as a result of the 
For-itse1f's presence to a "this." Exterior to the being of 
the For-itself, exterior to the being of the In-itself, the 
Bartrean categories thus cannot be construed to have meta-
physical significance as modalities of being. 
In view of the foregoing, it can be said that a meta-
phySical import cannot come to rest upon the Bartrean cate-
gories whether the For-itself be affirmed "substance" or "re-
lation." Moreover, the For-itself can in no way bear the 
burden of issuing even the Bartrean categories, even modalities 
of meanjng. No theoretical argument, however, would have any 
.. 
force against the Bartrean thesis. What do we mean by this? 
To the extent that we are presence to the world, we cannot re-
move ourselves from the world to test the Bartrean option that 
the region of In-itself is undifferentiated without the presence 
of the For-itself. But neither can Bartre evince such an 
option. Thus we and. Bartre must evince our stances on the con-
crete ground of being present to In-itself. From this common 
9 BN, 185. 
-
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ground, we ask Sartre onlY' one question: If the In-itself is 
undifferentiated, if the categories "merely indicate the in-
finite diversity of ways in which the freedom of the for-itself 
can ~ealize the indifference of being,nlO what is the found-
ation for this page being categorized as rectangular, as white, 
as destructible by two or ten or one hundred free For-itselfs? 
In order to account for our common experiences of "thises," it 
appears that more is required by way of foundation than spon-
taneity confronting indifference. Hence, we maintain that the 
For-i tself cannot bear the burden of issuing the Sartrean cat-
egories. 
~ Sartrean Contributions ~~Perennial MetaphYsic 
In drawing our study to a close, it would be well to 
point out the insights afforded by Sartre for a perennial meta-
physic. We suggest that Sartre is thrusting a challenge upon 
contemporary metaphysicians: to do metaphysics at the level 
of the concrete existent, instead of the formalistic level. 
This general Sartrean challenge can be formulated, moreover, in 
very specific ~erms. Sartre has done well to challenge tra-
ditional, sUbstantialist philosophies which predicate "sub-
stance" univocally of all actualities. While it is true that 
Aquinas and Descartes suggest a non-univocal predication of 
"substance" with regard to God and finite things, both fail to 
l~, 192. 
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go beyond a univocity or substance in dealing with the finite. 
Though analogy is writ large across the Thomistic system, an 
explication of the analogous character of substance as applied 
to the various levels or being is virtually non-existent. This 
general failure or substantialist philosophies not only strips 
their doctrines of substance of any relevance to the concrete, 
but also leads to the positing of other doctrines equally ir-
relevant. For example, the traditional, sUbstantialist position 
that independence in mode of being precludes internal related-
ness cannot stand the test of experience, as Bartre has shown. 
unless the metaphysician base his doctrine ot being upon the 
being ot stones. Then, too. as Bartre has pointed out. the 
traditional. substantialist doctrine of change which claims an 
element ot sameness throughout change actually nullifies the 
very meaning of change. To consider substance the unchanged is 
to deny change and to relegate time. moreover. to the arena of 
a mathematical abstraction. Though it is true that the Thomis-
tic tradition. with respect to the problem of change, views sub-
stance as a potential principle actualized by accidental forms, 
the inherent formalism ot that tradition comes to arrest the 
significance ot substance as a potential principle with its 
pronouncement that the thing remains the same what-it-is. re-
mains the same substantially, since such a pronouncement denies 
that the potential is the actualized. It appears, then, that 
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Sartre has well-directed his attack upon traditional, sub-
stantialist systems by pointing to the serious implications 
which metaphysical formalism has upon such doctrines as those 
of substance, relation, change and time. But, in summary, 
what are we to say of the Sartrean metaphysical insights? 
Sartre was led to a repudiation of a univocity of sub-
stance, to a reconciliation of independence in being with in-
ternal relatedness, to a reconsideration of theories of change 
and time !.!!. terms 2!. !!!2. analysis 2.t human realiY. The Sar-
trean system thus suggests that a more meaningful and more 
realistic metaphysics could be had if metaphysicians would 
utilize man as a starting-point in their metaphysical investi-
gations and work down the hierarchy of being to the level of 
the inanimate, if metaphysicians would actually work out the 
analogy of being. It is hence our conclusion that Sartre t s 
critique of traditional metaphysics is acutely perceptive and 
should lead to a more productive metaphysics than the formal-
istic systems of the past, if it be given a hearing.ll 
llThe work of John Wild, The Challenge ot Existential-
ism (Bloomington: Indiana UniverSItY Press, 19"59') show:a be 
CIted as an excellent attempt to show the continuity of ex-
istentialist themes with traditional themes and thereby to 
locate the existentialist movement within the realm of serious, 
philo sophic thought. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I. PRIMARY SOURCE 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Bei~ and Noth1~ess: An ESS¥:2.!!. 
Phenomenologica Oiito'l0¥o. rans. by Haze E. 
Barnes. New York: PhIosophical Library, 1956. 
II. SECONDARY SOURCES: BJOKS 
Blackham, H. J. "Jean-Paul Sartre," Six Existentialist 
!hinkers. New York: Harper Torchbooks t 1959. 
Collins, J. A HistorY of Modern EuroEean Philosophy_ 
MilwaUkee: Bruce, 19S1. 
___ -:. The Existentialists: A Critical Study. 
Chicago: Gateway, 1%0. -
Costelloe, B. and Muirhead, J. Aristotle and the Earlier 
Peripatetics. New York: Russell &1fussell', Inc., 
1962: 
Cranston, M. Jean-Paul Bartre. New York: Grove Press, 
1962. 
Desan, W. The Tra~c Finale. 
bOoItS;"' 196 • 
New York: Harper Torch-
Greene, N. Jean-Paul Sartre: The Existentialist Ethic. 
University of HichIgan:--xDn Arbor PaperDacks, 
1963. 
Jeanson, F. La Probleme morale et la ,ensae ~ Bartra. 
Paris: Editions du H#te, I94 • 
Jolivet,\R. Les Doctrines existentialistes de Kierkegaard 
~ J-P:-B'artre. Abbaye Saint-wandrilIe, 1948. 
Klubertanz, G. Introduction to the PhilosoP~ of Being. 
Second edition. New YOrX=- Appleton- entury-
Crofts, 1963. 
164 
165 
McCall, R. E. The Realita of Substance. A Dissertation--
PhilosoPlUcal Stu lea: No. 168. Wash1~ton: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1956. 
Natanson, M. A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre' s Ontology. 
Lincoln: trnlversItY of Nebraska Press, 1951. 
Owens, J. The Doctrine of :spirif in the Aristotelian Meta-
p~iICs. Toronto: on lHcil"'""lnstfEute of Hedle-
va StUdies, 1957. 
Randall, J. H. Aristotle. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 19~o. 
Ross, W. D. Aristotle. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 
1956. ' 
Salvan, J. To Be and :trot to Be. Detroit: Wayne State 
UniversI'iy-preSi';'" I9'6~ 
I Troisfontaines, R. Le Choix de Jean-Paul Sartre: ExPose 
et criti~ue de 'L'Etreet Ie neant'. Seconded-
Irion. arls: Aubier it 'OI"e, 1946. 
Varet, G. L'Ontologie de Sartre. Paris: Presses Uni-
versItaIres~e Prance. 1948. 
VerneauxJ "L'Ontologie phenomenologique de J.-P. Sartre." ~cons sur l'existentialism et ses formes prin-
c~les:--TrOlsleme PartIe. ~arIs: P. TeqUi, 
1 • 
Wild, J. The Challenge of Existentialism. Bloomington: 
rna.r-ana Uii1versiW Press, 1959. 
II. SEOONDARY SOURCES: ARTICLES 
Butts, R. "Does 'Intentionality' Imply 'Being'? A Para-
logism in Sartre's Ontology," Journal 2! Philos-
ophy, LV (1958), 911-12. 
Corvez, M. "L'Etre de 1a conscience dans la philo sophie 
de J.-P. Bartre," Revue Thomiste, LVIII (1950), 
562-74. 
• M. "L'Etre-en-soi dans la philosophie de Jean-------~Paul Sartre," Revue Thomiste, LVIII (1950), 360-72. 
Grooten, J. "Le soi chez Kierkegaard et Bartre," Revue 
Philosophigue ~ Louvain, L (1952), 64-89. 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submitted by Carol Ann Keene hal been 
read and approved by three member. of the Department 
of Philosophy. 
The final copies have been examined by the c11rector 
of the thesis and the signature which appears below 
verifies the fact that any nece.sary change. have been 
incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final 
approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical 
accuracy. 
The theli. 1s therefore accepted in parUal fulfillment 
of the requirements for the Degree of Ma.ter of .Arts. 
